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[American] lawyers are obliged, however, to yield to the
current of public opinion, which is too strong for them to
resist .... "
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer two questions. First, to what
degree has public opinion influenced American constitutional
interpretation, both on and off the Supreme Court, over the
past two centuries? Second, how much weight, if any, should
constitutional decision-makers give to public opinion, however
that protean concept is defined? The Article initially places
these queries in a contemporary context by considering the
extended discussion of public opinion in the Planned
Parenthood v. Casey1 opinions of Justice Souter,2 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia. Justice Souter partially relied on
public opinion to not overrule the constitutional right to an
abortion created in Roe v. Wade,3 while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia claimed in their Casey dissents
that public opinion was constitutionally irrelevant.4
** 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 279 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1835); see Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 17 (1988) (illustrating the influence of
public opinion on the Supreme Court); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that
Courts cannot make "significant" changes without support from the electoral
branches); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing that Justices follow
election returns). But see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992) (asserting
that judicial doctrine has a major effect on outcomes and that the Justices are
relatively insulated from policy and political considerations). Law and public
opinion have a symbiotic relationship: "The history of the Anglo-Saxon race shows
that, for ages past, the members of the legal profession have been powerful for
good or evil to the government. They are, by the nature of their duties, the
moulders of public sentiment on questions of government ... ." Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 385-86 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that Congress
cannot condition pardon to keep attorney out of federal courts by requiring loyalty
oath).
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. The New York Times reported that Justice Souter was primarily
responsible for the joint opinion. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling
Court Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-15. Contra id. at 2862-63, 2884.
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The second part of the Article demonstrates that all three
Justices' arguments in Casey have a viable intellectual
tradition. This section presents a history of public opinion from
before the American Revolution to the present. It considers the
views of David Hume, James Madison, Chief Justice Marshall,
Abraham Lincoln, Chief Justice Taney, and Justice Brandeis,
along with a host of others.
Part III argues that :public opinion ought to influence many
constitutional decisions. In other words, public opinion is a
legitimate interpretive factor, comparable to text, history,
structure, precedent, and policy. Indeed, some constitutional
disputes, such as impeachment standards and proceedings, can
only be effectively regulated by public opinion.
Public opinion can either expand or contract important
constitutional rights. The different fates of Supreme Court
nominees Robert Bork and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are public
reaffirmations of the Supreme Court's previous decisions
outlawing gender discrimination; Bork characterized such
non-originalist outcomes in the area of sexual equality as
"illegitimate," or "unsatisfactory"' while Ginsburg was a
leading advocate of gender neutrality. On the other hand, the
Court's unwillingness to combat segregated suburban schools in
Milliken v. Bradley6 becomes somewhat defensible because of
probable adverse public opinion, confirmed by the country's
continued unwillingness to rectify the underlying problems.
Other important cases appear different when viewed from this
perspective. Justice Powell's condemnation in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke' of "quotas" while approving
of "diversity" in affirmative action plans may not be very
coherent or elegant, yet his opinion was arguably the "best"
decision, simply because both political sides have adopted his
rhetoric in the subsequent debate over this inherently
contentious issue.
Some constitutional rights, however, are so important that
the Court should resist public opinion. For example, the "core"
5. ROBERT H. BORE, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 131, 330 (1990); see also Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding,
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177,
1272 n.397 (1987) (regretfully concluding that gender discrimination decisions are
illegitimate).
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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right in Brown v. Board of Education8 of all schoolchildren to
be able to attend public schools that do not overtly, maliciously
segregate on the basis of race, should be immune from current
public influence. Such observations and arguments lead to a
questioning, or at least to a qualification, of the significance of
"principles," neutral or otherwise, in constitutional
adjudication.
For those who are theoretically inclined, the most
important constitutional debate is not about any particular
decision but involves the permissible modes of constitutional
interpretation.9 The Supreme Court, leading political
thinkers,10 and major American politicians have frequently
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. The history of constitutional adjudication extends beyond the rise and fall
of certain cases and doctrines to the ebb and flow of particular forms of argument.
See PHILIP BOBBilT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982). Precluding particular forms of
rhetoric can constrain judicial discretion, determining the appropriate role for the
unelected judiciary within the American constitutional system. Justices can claim to
be more "neutral" and more consistent if they apply the same forms of reasoning
in different contexts.
Most importantly, the "legitimacy" of outcomes depends upon the choice of
"legitimate" arguments. Raoul Berger's unyielding originalism calls into question
the seminal school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, because the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers stated that public schools could remain
segregated. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 118-19 (1977). Bork's originalism undermines
Brown's cousin, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Boling applied the "equal
protection component" of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
outlaw school segregation in the District of Columbia, even though the Framers
never intended such an interpretation. BoRK, supra note 5, at 83, 305-06. John
Hart Ely construed "representation reinforcement" to uphold the school
desegregation cases but to question the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
10. The battle over the role of public opinion recurs in many doctrinal
debates. For instance, Professor Blasi partially defended the prior restraint doctrine
because "the dissemination of speech may create public opinion pressures that can
exert a healthy influence on the formulation and application of first amendment
standards." Vincent Blasi, Towards a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 50-51 (1981).
As part of his critique of Blasi's multifaceted defense of the prior restraint
doctrine, Professor Redish made three interrelated arguments:
Initially, the public would not likely react to particular expression with
sufficient fervor and unanimity that the reaction would be widely
noticed .... [Elven if the public did express a coherent and favorable
opinion, it is doubtful that that view would influence a court's substantive
constitutional analysis. Moreover, it is arguable that it should not do so
in any event because most would agree that generally a strong negative
public reaction to challenged expression should have no influence on
judicial constitutional analysis.
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
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and legitimately used several conceptions of "public opinion" in
constitutional interpretation to create a complex constitutional
tradition. The Supreme Court, in particular, has ranged from
giving determinative weight to public opinion, conceptualized in
a variety of ways, to excluding public opinion completely from
constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, the Court has
tended to refer expressly to public opinion when the issues
were particularly contentious.
Some historical context is needed before turning to the
Casey decision. United States v. Hudson" is a classic, early
example of the Court expressly applying public opinion to
resolve a controversial issue, e.g., whether federal courts could
recognize common law crimes. The issue had embroiled the
country for some years before the Supreme Court resolved it. In
1793, a lower federal court instructed the jury to find the
defendant, Gideon Henfield, guilty for violating a presidential
proclamation: "As a citizen of the United States, he was bound
to act no part which could injure the nation .... This is the
law of nations; not an ex post facto law, but a law that was in
existence long before Gideon Henfield existed." 2 In 1798,
Justice Chase, presiding over a lower court trial of a man
charged with bribing a federal official, disagreed: "[T]he United
States, as a federal government, have no common law; and,
consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their courts,
for offences merely at the common law."'3 When the Supreme
Court finally addressed the issue fourteen years later in United
States v. Hudson, Justice Johnson adopted Justice Chase's
conclusion that federal courts could not create common law
crimes. The most startling aspect of Johnson's opinion was his
reasoning:
Although this question is brought up now for the first
time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having
been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for
many years has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the
general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 60 (1984).
11. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that government cannot bring
common law seditious libel action against newspaper).
12. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
13. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No.
16,766). For a brief discussion of Justice Chase's jurisprudence, see STEPHEN B.
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING 98-99 (1991).
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opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition. 14
Justice Johnson's argument has enormous contemporary
implications. For example, what if Justice Blackmun had based
the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade completely on the views of
the American Medical Association? 5 Further, imagine the
Supreme Court stating in Bowers v. Hardwick that
homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in their form
of consensual sexuality solely because public opinion resolved
the issue. 6
II. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: A MODERN EXAMPLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT'S RELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC OPINION
Although it is chilling to imagine the existing Court basing
its decisions only on public opinion, Supreme Court Justices
have considered public opinion's relevance to constitutional
adjudication. The most dramatic recent example is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.7 In Casey, five Justices refused to
reverse the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, "the right of the
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to
obtain it without undue interference from the State.""
Premising the joint opinion" on such relatively
immutable concepts as the rule of law, stare decisis and a
judicial commitment to principle, 0 Justice Souter claimed
that the people would only support judicial opinions that
transcend immediate public opinion:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises
with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing
on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
14. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
15. 410 U.S. 113, 141-44 (1973).
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexuality is not protected by
substantive due process).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
18. Id. at 2804.
19. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy signed the joint opinion.
20. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
10371 1043
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the Nation.2'
According to Justice Souter, the Court must resist partisan
opposition to its most important, "watershed" opinions: "So to
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling
reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."22 In other
words, Roe v. Wade gained additional authority by being so
fiercely criticized, so divisive.
Justice Souter had at least two conceptions of the public
who create public opinion: First, the partisans who evaluate an
opinion for its compatibility with their beliefs, and second, the
broader spectrum of society that believes in the "rule of law."
The Supreme Court needs the latter group's sympathy, support,
and respect to preserve the overall legitimacy of the legal
system: "Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
the Nation."23 One reason Justice Souter affirmed Roe was to
create the judicial constancy that would sustain overall public
respect for the Supreme Court, even if many members of the
public disliked the Courts protecting women's right to an
abortion under the Constitution.
In his concurrence/dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed
with what he viewed to be the plurality's position: "[T]his
Court's duty [is] to ignore the public criticism and protest that
may arise as a result of a decision. Few would quarrel with this
statement." Chief Justice Rehnquist then criticized the
plurality for actually incorporating public opinion into its
analysis by being less willing to overrule "intensely divisive"
cases. 5 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
"divisiveness" standard leads to the paradox of retaining
unpopular decisions until opposition fades away. Furthermore,
the standard forces the Court to make judgments beyond the
Court's capacity: "[B]ecause the Court's duty is to ignore public
opinion and criticism on issues that come before it, its
members are in perhaps the worst position to judge whether a
decision divides the Nation deeply enough to justify such
21. Id. at 2814.
22. Id. at 2815.
23. Id at 2814 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, CiJ., concurring & dissenting).
25. Id. at 2862-63.
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uncommon protection."26 Although he claimed to agree with
Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist created a far more
severe form of isolationism. The Court is obligated to ignore not
only public opinion but also "criticism." If one takes Chief
Justice Rehnquist literally, there is one less reason for
commentators to critique constitutional law.
Justice Souter's opinion did not preclude public opinion
from consideration even as much as Chief Justice Rehnquist
had claimed. In addition to justifying his commitment to
principle and stare decisis because such steadfastness
preserves public respect for the Court, Justice Souter consulted
public opinion to determine which "watershed" constitutional
cases should have been overruled. For example, he concluded
that the Lochner substantive due process cases28  were
properly reversed because it "seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected . . . rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."29 He also
quoted Professor Charles Black's explanation of why Brown
legitimately overruled Plessy v. Ferguson: "[Tihat question has
meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history
and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times
and places aforesaid.""0 Justice Souter believed that the Court
could only keep favorable public opinion by ignoring divisive
26. Id. at 2863 (emphasis added).
27. "Most lobbying by the executive and legislative branches is open and
direct; lobbying by the judiciary is filtered through legal briefs, professional
meetings, and law review articles." FISHER, supra note **, at 19; see also Fowler
V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1172 (1953); Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and Legal Writing: Learned
Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105 (1959).
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (signalling
demise of Lochner era).
29. 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (emphasis added).
30. 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960) (emphasis added)). Turning to
Roe, Justice Souter used the ambiguous collective pronoun "our," apparently
extending his perspective beyond the Court (which frequently refers to itself as
"We"): "[NMeither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed." 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (emphasis added). Justice
Souter used the same ambiguous pronoun later in the same opinion to reject cases
refusing to extend equal protection to women: "These views, of course, are no
longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the
Constitution." Id. at 2831 (emphasis added).
1037] 1045
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public reactions, at least until the public is no longer divisive
and has developed a broad consensus that the Court has erred.
Justice Souter's opinion is simultaneously a plea for continuity
and a justification of perpetual constitutional reinterpretation.
The Supreme Court can transform "watershed" constitutional
caselaw whenever it discerns a widespread belief that a
particular form of constitutional jurisprudence is ineffective or
otherwise inappropriate.31 In the absence of such a finding,
the Court should accept the status quo, applying the doctrine of
stare decisis. Justice Souter is assuming that the Court can
make some very fine-tuned determinations. Not only must the
Court determine when an issue is so contentious that the Court
should remain committed to the status quo, but the Court must
also ascertain when public opinion has so shifted that the
Court should overrule its prior decisions. This task will be
difficult because some disagreement will linger over virtually
every important constitutional issue. In other words, when do
judicial critics constitute a merely divisive dissent instead of an
overwhelming majority that should pressure the Court to
change watershed decisions?
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence/dissent that the
furious controversy over abortion placed the Court in a
hopeless position in terms of public opinion. Many would see
the Court as capitulating to public pressure no matter what it
did:
Wle have been subjected to what the Court calls "political
pressure" by both sides of this issue .... Maybe today's
decision not to overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to
pressure from that direction. Instead of engaging in the
hopeless task of predicting public perception-a job not for
lawyers but for political campaign managers-the Justices
should do what is legally right .... 32
Justice Scalia also bemoaned the public's impression that their
reactions mattered: "How upsetting it is, that so many of our
citizens ... think that we Justices should properly take into
account their views, as though we were engaged not in
31. Justice Souter's argument suggests that the Court periodically transforms
its doctrine, modes of argument, and outcomes. Similar notions have arisen in legal
academia. Professor Ackerman has delineated three major constitutional "moments":
the Founding, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the New Deal. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
32. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting & concurring).
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ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of
social consensus."33
This Article's review of Supreme Court cases that consider
public opinion, usually in express terms, concludes that Justice
Souter's candid, flexible incorporation of public opinion into
constitutional interpretation better reflects constitutional
history. His approach is more consistent with the weight of
Supreme Court precedent, as seen in Hudson, than with the
more monastic views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. But Justice Souter is only employing the historically
dominant view; the Rehnquist-Scalia position retains its own
constitutional pedigree. Putting the issue more generally, the
Court traditionally has vacillated between the two competing
sub-traditions expressed in Casey.
This Article does not argue solely from tradition. If
consequentialism is to play any role in constitutional
adjudication,34 the Court should consider public reactions,
including enforcement difficulties, whenever it formulates
doctrine. As Justice Frankfurter explained, constitutional
adjudication is "applied politics."35  Frankfurter gave a
compelling example to support his precept: "The simple truth of
the matter is that decisions of the Court denying or sanctioning
the exercise of federal power, as in the first child labor case,
largely involve a judgment about practical matters, and not at
all any esoteric knowledge of the Constitution."3 6 Judicial
politics must include a strain of realpolitik, an awareness of
the limitations of both power and principle. The Court must not
only evaluate previous public responses and the existing state
of public opinion, but it must also anticipate how the public
will react to its decisions.37
33. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia expressed similar sentiments in his
concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 535
(Scalia, J., concurring) (1989) (permitting extensive state regulation of abortion).
34. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-03
(1921).
35. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, SURVEY (1913),
reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER
1913-1918, at 3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1962).
36. Felix Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 1, 1924 (unsigned editorial), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at
10, 12. The Court's political role made judges "less than ever technical expounders
of technical provisions of the Constitution. They are arbiters of the economic and
social life of vast regions and at times of the whole country." FELIX FRANKFURTER
& JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 173 (1928); see also
Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. POL. SCI. 7 (1986).
37. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
1037] 1047
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Self-consciously including public opinion in constitutional
adjudication also raises basic jurisprudential questions. For
instance, how can Justice Souter's sensitivity to public opinion
coexist with his commitment to "principle"?38 Does public
opinion have any place in Justice Scalia's search for "objective
law"? 39 Does the concept of public opinion destroy the
distinction between law and politics, thereby undermining "the
rule of law," the autonomy, and even the legitimacy of the
Court?4" How can the constitutionalization of public opinion
be reconciled with the anti-majoritarian impulse that questions
yet justifies judicial review?41 Are there methodological and
ideological differences in trying to ascertain public opinion
instead of "tradition" and "history"? On a more disturbing level,
is law nothing more than an elaborate fiction, a fluid collection
of metaphors which creates a secular "religion" that we lawyers
hope the public will find acceptable? This Article cannot
pretend to resolve such difficult questions; it seeks to make
those queries more immediate. At the very least, conscious
incorporation of public opinion into constitutional doctrine
makes constitutional law even more indeterminate.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN
CONSTITUTIONAL IN'TERPRETATION FROM THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION THROUGH THE LOCHNER ERA
This section presents a brief intellectual history describing
the evolution of the concept of public opinion from an
eighteenth-century, aristocratic sense of honor among
gentlemen to the triumph of the masses by the early
(1990) (discussing how politicians anticipate public opinion as well as respond to
it.)
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
39. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REViW (1989); see also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989) (describing relationship of Supreme Court
opinions to public opinion polls).
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43 (1989). Justice Chase held that the
federal courts were "the only proper and competent authority to decide whether
any statute made by congress ... is contrary to ... the federal constitution."
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.CD. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
42. I wish to thank Professors Lazarus and Gellman for helping me develop
this question. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAiTH (1988); Sanford
Levinson, "The Constitution' in Anerican Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1048 1993
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
nineteenth century. Different conceptions of public opinion
influenced leading pre-Revolutionary cases, political theorists,
the Constitutional ratification debates, the political conflict
between the Republicans and the Federalists, decisions by the
early judiciary, and the controversy over slavery. Most of these
conceptions of public opinion have continued to influence
constitutional thought.4"
A. The Influence of Public Opinion on Law and
Constitutional Thought Prior to the Constitution
America's cult of celebrity is merely a perversion of the
Enlightenment. When the Enlightenment thinkers rejected the
centrality of a Christian God, including the accoutrements of
Heaven and Hell," they had to find substitutes to bind and
regulate society. Part of the Enlightenment's solution,45 as
expressed by Adam Smith, was the Principle of Approbation:
"For approbation, heightened by wonder and surprise, consti-
tutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, and of
which applause is the natural expression." Human beings,
governed by passion,4 7 naturally seek the approval of other
humans. They will perform great feats, benefitting all, to gain
that recognition. Smith asked: "For to what purpose is all the
toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and
ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and
pre-eminence?" His answer was a cheerful echo of
Ecclesiasticism:
43. Because public opinion is such a protean concept, it has played numerous
roles. Dicey wrote that the concept of public opinion was an "abstraction." A.V.
DICEY, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND 414 (2d ed. 1914).
44. According to Professor Horwitz, the Lochner formalists hoped "neutral,"
"autonomous" law would serve as a secular replacement to keep society cohesive.
MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 193
(Oxford University Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1870-
1960].
45. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers offered other social bind-
ing agents. Adam Smith recommended the market. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). Most Enlightenment theorists preferred some form of
"republicanism," premised upon virtue instead of force. GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104-05 (1992) (discussing evolution of
beliefs about necessary societal adhesives).
46. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 64 (1759).
47. I& at 75; see also ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSON-
ALITY (1984).
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To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with
sympathy, complacency, and approbation,' are all the advan-
tages. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which
interests us. But vanik is always founded upon the belief of
our being the object of attention and approbation.48
David Hume had another, more global definition of public
opinion: "It may farther be said, that, though men be much
governed by interest; yet even interest itself, and all human
affairs, are entirely governed by opinion."49 On the Continent,
Rousseau also concluded that opinion was the foundation of
government:
What means has the government for shaping behavior? I
respond: public opinion. If our conduct arises from our own
feelings in solitude, it arises from the opinion of others in
society .... Not reason, not virtue, not the laws can oversway
public opinion unless one finds a means of changing the lat-
ter. o
For Rousseau, public opinion was a country's actual constitu-
tion.5 '
Public opinion was not just a device of abstract political
theory. At several critical moments, public opinion dramatically
influenced the Anglo-American legal system. The protracted
48. SMITH, supra note 46, at 113.
49. DAVID HUME, Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute
Monarchy or to a Republic, in 1 ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 51 (Eu-
gene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1777) [hereinafter HUME, British Govern-
ment]; see DAVID HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in 1 ESSAYS MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, supra, at 32-36 [hereinafter HUME, First Principles].
There is a narrower version of Flume's argument; the Court always considers pub-
lic opinion in constitutional cases because elected officials' actions invariably reflect
public opinion, at least to some degree. See DICEY, supra note 43, at 3. Professor
Dicey was not the first to make such an argument. In 1795, a lawyer told the
United States Supreme Court that "[tihe Conftitution of Pennfylvania explicitly
provides, that no law fhall be paffed prohibiting emigration from the ftate. This
is, perhaps, the only direct expreffion of the public fentiment on the fubject."
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 142 (1795) (argument of counsel). Indeed,
the entire constitutional text expresses a form of public opinion. The public that
ratified the constitutional text approved of certain words with generally understood
meanings. Part of the Court's job is to determine what the public meant when it
ratified a particular text.
50. GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTEN-
MENT 99-100 (1984) (quoting JFJAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, LETTRE A M. D'ALEMBERT
176, 178 (Paris, Garnier-Flammarion 1967)).
51. JEAN-JACQUES RoussEmu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 272 (Charles M.
Sherover trans., 1984) (1762).
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struggle between Lord Coke and King James over the relation-
ships between the Common Law and the Royal Prerogative
took place during "heightened popular feeling" caused by the
High Commission's imprisoning the lawyer Nicholas Fuller for
contempt. Fuller had been battling that Royal Court's efforts to
force individuals to make an oath affirming particular religious
beliefs.52 In the absence of such angry public sentiments, Coke
might have been unable to defy the King.
The trial of the Seven Bishops in 1688 was a turning point
in the almost century-long conflict between the Stuart Kings
and the coalition of Parliament and Common Law lawyers.
King James, a Catholic, demanded that seven Anglican Church
Bishops read in their churches a declaration endorsing James'
annulment of existing religious laws. When the Bishops re-
fused, James charged them with seditious libel. Three judges
rejected the Bishops' defense of truth. But Judge Powell in-
structed the jury that James had acted illegally by annulling
existing laws and that truth was a defense.53 Lord MacAulay
graphically described the public reaction to the jury's acquittal,
showing how emotional public opinion can be: 'Yet were the
acclamations less strange than the weeping. For the feelings of
men had been wound up to such a point that at length the
stern English nature, so little used to outward signs of emotion,
gave way, and thousands sobbed aloud for very joy."54
The Seven Bishops case affected the American trial of
Peter Zenger for seditious libel in 1735. Zenger printed some
pieces, written by James Alexander, which criticized the Royal
Governor's administration. Like the Bishops, Zenger pled truth
as a defense. The prosecution claimed truth was either irrele-
vant or an aggravating factor, undermining and insulting the
government. The prosecutor argued that three of the four judg-
es in the Seven Bishops case had rejected the defense of truth.
Zenger's attorney replied:
If it be objected that the opinions of the other three judges
were against [Powell], I answer that the censures the judg-
ments of these men have undergone, and the approbation
Justice Powells opinion, his judgment and conduct upon that
trial has met with, and the honor he gained to himself for
52. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 298-306 (1957).
53. 2 LORD THOMAS B. MAcAuLAY, MACAULAY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 165-67
(1954).
54. Id. at 168.
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daring to speak truth at such a time, upon such an occasion,
and in the reign of such a King, is more than sufficient in my
humble opinion, to warrant our insisting on his judgment as a
full authority to our prpose.55
Zenger's lawyer was arguing that the public reaction, both
immediate and historical., legitimated Powell's sole opinion in
the Seven Bishops case, giving it full authority, not just rele-
vance. Zenger's judges, however, agreed with the prosecution.
They defined and applied "opinion" to achieve the opposite
result; the government should not be libelled even by true
statements because the people need to have "a good opinion of
it." 56 The jury ignored the judges and acquitted Zenger, trig-
gering another enthusiastic public outburst.5 7 Public opinion
55. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 72 (Stanley N. Katz
ed., 2d ed., Belnap Press 1972) (1736).
56. Id. at 100 (quoting The Queen v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's State Trials 1096,
1128 (1704)).
57. Id. at 101. It should not be surprising that the Zenger and Seven Bishops
case juries, which had the power to decide questions of law and fact, reflected
existing public opinion. Juries are an essential part of the Anglo-American legal
tradition because they manifest community mores. Just as juries sometimes ignore
existing law, they also protect the "rule of law" from corrupt rulers. John Adams
explained that the jury placed inside the "executive branch of the constitution . ..
a mixture of popular power." Because of this popular power, "the subject is guard-
ed in the execution of the laws." BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74 (1967) (quoting Letter from John Adams). Members
of the Court have acknowledged the link between juries and general public opinion:
"[Tiwelve people are more likely than one person to reflect public sentiment."
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 487 n.33 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring & dis-
senting) (holding that judge can implement death penalty despite jury recommenda-
tion of mercy) (quoting Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
63 (1980)).
The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debate over the appropriate role of the
jury, a struggle the jury system largely lost as the judges gradually excluded juries
from deciding "questions of law," revolved around the appropriate role of public
opinion in all types of adjudication. In the early 1800s, former Speaker of the
House Theodore Sedgwick recommended major changes in the judge-jury relation-
ship: "In all instances where trial by jury has been practiced, and a separation of
the law from the fact has taken place, there have been expedition, certainty, sys-
tem and their consequences, general approbation." RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFER-
SONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLrICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 190 (1971). Justice
Gray also defended the expanded judicial role: "[Wihen the law is settled by a
court, there is more certainty than when done by a jury, it will be better known
and more respected in public opinion." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 164
(1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (holding uncontradicted confession by one defendant of
joint commission of murder admissible against both defendants). Nevertheless, con-
tinuing jury powers, particularly nullification, demonstrate that public opinion plays
a major role within the legal system at the critical point of determining criminal
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had made truth a defense.
According to the historian Gordon Wood, it was no coinci-
dence that the Zenger case was a libel case involving rulers'
reputations. Unique social and economic forces made the Amer-
ican elite protective of their reputations. Bereft of formal ranks
of nobility, the elite needed their reputation to gain respect and
financial credit.58 As a result, libel litigation flourished in the
eighteenth century. For instance, a boat manufacturer sued
someone for saying his boats were "only fit to drown people."59
The American aristocracy's quest for fame extended beyond
personal benefit. Douglas Adair asserted in his famous essay,
Fame and the Founding Fathers, that the leaders of the Revo-
lutionary generation, many of whom also framed the Constitu-
tion, were obsessed with public opinion and with their place in
history."° Furthermore, the pursuit of glory was virtuous.
Gordon Wood has described that impulse in almost existential
terms: '"Everyone had appetites and interests, but only the
restless-minded, the great-souled, the extraordinary few, had
ambition-that overflowing desire to excel, to have precedence,
and to achieve fame." 1
There were obvious political ramifications in courting pub-
lic opinion. The Revolutionary leaders knew their revolution
succeeded because public opinion supported it; the Revolution-
aries had put into practice Hume's truism about the primacy of
opinion." John Adams reminisced about this point in a letter
to Jefferson:
What do we mean by the Revolution? The war? That was no
part of the Revolution; it was only an effect and consequence
of it. The Revolution was in the minds of the people, and this
was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years
before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington.'
Jefferson would hardly disagree. His plea in the Declaration of
guilt or innocence. At the very least, the Anglo-American legal system has never
been completely premised on objectivity and principle.
58. WooD, supra note 45, at 38-39.
59. Id. at 60.
60. DOUGLAS ADAIR, FA E AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1974).
61. WOOD, supra note 45, at 39. Wood believed that the gentlemen of the
period were far more concerned about their reputation among their peers than
with general public opinion. Id. at 40-41.
62. See HUME, British Government, supra note 49.
63. BAILYN, supra note 57, at 1 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas
Jefferson, 1815).
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Independence was addressed to the court of world opinion and
thus to history: "When in the Course of human Events, it be-
comes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands
which have connected them with another... a decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare
the causes which impel them to the Separation."64
The pre-Revolutionary American public did not express its
views solely through juries or eloquent revolutionary docu-
ments and pamphlets. The lower classes, generally excluded
from power, periodically took to the streets as semi-organized
mobs. They undermined the Royal government's capacity to
enforce general writs of assistance by gathering near buildings
that were to be searched, thereby intimidating the officials.6"
Thomas Hutchinson, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, felt
the sting of public opinion most directly: a mob burned his
house down in 1765. Hutchinson's Humean analysis should
come as little surprise: "Authority is in the populace... no law
can be carried into execution against their mind."6
Not all eighteenth-century thinkers found even cold com-
fort in the dominance of opinion. David Hume agreed with
Rousseau that public opinion determined governmental rule
but did not find that linkage reassuring:
As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors
have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim
extends to the most despotic and most military governments,
as well as to the most free and most popular.6'
Opinion was simply a fearsome, inevitable force: "Government
is instituted in order to restrain the fury and injustice of the
people, and being always founded on opinion, not on force, it is
dangerous to weaken, by speculation, the reverence that the
multitude owe to authority."68 Hume would not have been sur-
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis add-
ed). The original feminist manifesto made a similar plea to "the opinions of man-
kind." THE SENECA FALLS DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS para. 1
(1848).
65. M.H. SMITH, THE WRrrs OF ASSIsTANcE CASE 446 (1978).
66. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON 73-74 (1974)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Hutchison to Samuel Jackson).
67. HUME, First Principles, supra note 49, at 32-33, quoted in DICEY, supra
note 43, at 2. Hume noted that governments gained strength over time from opin-
ion. HUME, First Principles, supra note 49, at 33.
68. 5 DAVID HUME, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 59 (1863). Nor would Hume have
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prised by the blunt reductionism of the despot Napoleon: "Opin-
ion rules everything."
69
Many other pre-revolutionary leaders in America expressed
views similar to Hume's, revealing the self-conscious hierarchi-
cal gap between the untitled American aristocracy and their
fellow Americans." Early in his career, John Adams referred
to the masses as the "common Herd of Mankind."' In 1774,
John Randolph applied a class analysis to public opinion,
bluntly stating: '"Then I mention the public,... I mean to
include only the rational part of it. The ignorant vulgar are as
unfit to judge of the modes, as they are unable to manage the
reins of government."7 2 Randolph elevated the "reasoned"
views of the elite above the ignorant reactions of the passionate
masses.
Soon after the American Revolution, the Federalists, who
agreed with Hume's concerns about the masses, battled
Jefferson's Republicans over the significance of public opinion,
both in and out of court. Hume's conservatism infuriated men
like Jefferson,7 1 who saw public opinion as presumptively lib-
erating. Perhaps Hume provoked Jefferson by striking a nerve.
Jefferson wrote in 1788, twelve years after the Declaration of
Independence, that "'tavern keepers, Valets de place, and
postilions'-were 'the hackneyed rascals of every country' who
quarrelled with Samuel Johnson's basing aesthetic evaluations upon public opinion:
"A man ... who writes a book, thinks himself wiser or wittier than the rest of
mankind; he supposes that he can instruct or amuse them, and the publick to
whom he appeals, must, after all, be the judges of his pretensions." JAMES
BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 142 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980)
(1791). Boswell prefaced that quote by noting- "[Johnson] had, indeed, upon all
occasions, a great deference for the general opinion." Id
69. DICEY, supra note 43, at 1 n.1.
70. The debate over whose public opinion should count more, the views of the
elite or the masses, continues to this day. For a powerful defense of democracy
against elitist "guardianships," see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
52-79 (1989). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of
Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U. L. REV. 71 (1986); Symposium, Constitutional Ad-
judication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952);
J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
71. WOOD, supra note 45, at 27.
72. Gordon S. Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolu-
tion, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 102, 106-07 (Robert
H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979) (quoting JOHN RANDOLPH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA (1774)).
73. GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 32 (1981).
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'must never be considered when we calculate the national char-
acter.' "7 Jefferson preferred the small agrarian farmer, made
independent by his land, to the urban masses. Nor was Jef-
ferson sanguine about human nature. He warned the Virginia
assembly about governmental corruption because "human na-
ture is the same on every side of the Atlantic."75 Thomas
Paine had a purer Republican perspective, linking public opin-
ion, free speech, and democracy together through a plain writ-
ing style designed to reach a broad audience.76 In his libel de-
fense of Thomas Paine for writing Rights of Man, Erskine ex-
plained the basic linkage between free speech, public opinion,
and a just government: "[T]he liberty of opinion keeps govern-
ments themselves in due subjection to their duties."77
In conclusion, the concept of "opinion" already had several
meanings before the drafting and ratification of the Constitu-
tion. Political theorists like Hume and Rousseau used "opinion"
as an all-embracing concept that described the temper of the
times, the Zeitgeist.78 During the colonial period, most of the
American elite saw mass public opinion as an irrational threat
to individual liberties, while revolutionaries like Erskine and
Thomas Paine believed only public opinion could prevent tyran-
ny. s Finally, early leaders sometimes conceived of public
opinion as the verdict of their gentlemen peers and at other
times as the will of the entire people. Public opinion analysis
therefore has at least two factors: (1) a determination of whose
opinions are to be consulted, and (2) an assessment of what
weight, if any, should be given to those views.
74. WOOD, supra note 45, at 28 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Hints to Ameri-
cans Traveling in Europe (June 19, 1788), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 268 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1954-55)).
75. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1955) (1787).
76. Wood, supra note 72, at 110-11.
77. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 186 n.4 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(holding that plaintiff who is public figure can depose news media about state of
mind to determine malice); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48
(1936) (enjoining state tax on newspapers) (quoting 1 LORD ERSEINE, SPEECHES OF
LORD ERSKINE 525 (James L. High ed., 1876); see also LLOYD P. STRYKER, FOR THE
DEFENSE 210-16 (1947).
78. To the degree that Hume is right, this article involves everything and
therefore has difficulty proving anything. Supreme Court Justices are no more
capable of escaping the Zeitgeist than the rest of us.
79. See ERSK[NE, supra nota 77, at 525.
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B. Public Opinion and the Framing of the Constitution
The Framers of the Constitution viewed public opinion as a
constitutional lodestone. In The Federalist, Madison accepted
Hume's truism as a premise: "If it be true that all governments
rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in
each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct,
depend much on the number which he supposes to have enter-
tained the same opinion.""m However, Madison did not fear
public opinion as much as Hume, creating two definitions of
public opinion: public passion and public reason,"' Madison
wrote: "[Ilt is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to
control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be
controlled and regulated by the government." 2 Because he
had to obtain votes from average citizens as well as from his
fellow gentlemen, Madison broke down the prevailing distinc-
tion, as expressed by Randolph, between the elite and the rest
of the citizenry. One can assume Madison believed that consti-
tutional supporters, of whatever class, exercised "public rea-
son." "Reason" and "passion" were no longer class differences
but rather political distinctions.
Because the Constitution had to be ratified by the voters,
the Framers were intensely aware of and deferential to public
opinion. They believed the voters could legitimate the new
Constitution by consent. Madison wrote in The Federalist83
that the constitutional delegates "must have borne in mind
that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submit-
ted to the people themselves,.., its approbation [would] blot
out antecedent errors and irregularities."' Some of the irregu-
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314-15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of
The Federalist Papers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 65 (discussing how the Supreme Court
has utilized The Federalist in opinions).
81. Madison's distinction between reason and passion permitted the people,
who tend toward passion, to create a legitimate, viable government if they followed
reason: "Elsewhere [Madison] has said that only the people have the right to es-
tablish a constitutional system; but now he adds a qualifier-the people can do it
only when they are calm." WILLS, supra note 73, at 28.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 80, at 317.
83. The Federalist Papers were carefully written to influence an uncertain
electorate. George Washington feared he would undermine the drive for national-
ization by making any public endorsements; many would believe he was seeking
despotic power. WILLS, supra note 50, at 102-03.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 80, at 253 (James Madison). Madison
later made the same argument about the Bill of Rights. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG.
772 (1796) (Statement of James Madison), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
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laxities were rather significant. The Constitution's ratification
process ignored the existing Article of Confederation's require-
ment that all states consent to any amendments.85 The Con-
stitutional convention drafted a document that vastly exceeded
what many people understood the primary purpose of the con-
vention to be: facilitating commercial relations.86 Thus the
electorate had to decide the most important constitutional
question of all: Should the new Constitution be ratified in ex-
press violation of the terms of the existing constitution? In
other words, the crucial jurisprudential concept of consent is a
form of public opinion.
During the ratification campaign, the Framers had cause
to fear existing public opinion. Many Framers were strong
nationalists, even monarchists, but they lived in a land still
fearful of any concentration of power. Their rebuttals to the
Anti-Federalists' claims that the new Constitution would con-
centrate governmental power were less than candid: "The Fed-
eralists met this attack by an attempt to deny the accusation in
public, but it seems from their private statements that they
intended to create a national government, although prevailing
opinion obliged them to compromise."" The Federalists may
have designed the Constitution to rein in democratic senti-
ments, but the ratification campaign required them to glorify
those sentiments: 'We, sir, idolize democracy."88
Neither Madison nor Hamilton thought any written Consti-
tution could ever transcend public opinion. For Hamilton, pub-
lic opinion limited all written constitutions. Concerning free-
dom of the press he said, "[W]hatever fine declarations may be
inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether de-
pend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people
and of the government."89 Madison concurred: "The restric-
MADISON 263 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). For a discussion of the multiple levels of
constitutional thought and power, see John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Essay:
Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90
MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992).
85. Forrest McDonald, however, argued that the Constitution actually com-
plied with the Articles' requirements. FORREST MCDONALD, NoVUS ORDO SECLORUM
279 (1985).
86. Id. at 98.
87. JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERAUSTS 121 (1961).
88. Wood, supra note 72, at 116 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP1ION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 222 (reprint
ed. Ayer Co. 1987) (1888) (statement of John Marshall)).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 80, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton).
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tions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded
when opposed to the decided sense of the public."9° Madison
demonstrated how public opinion could transform the constitu-
tional debate over federalism:
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people
should in future become more partial to the federal than to
the State governments, the change can only result from such
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as
will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that
case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be
most due.91
The Framers of the Constitution designed the new govern-
ment both to incorporate and regulate public opinion. Most
tellingly, the people only directly elected the members of the
House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the will of the people
permeated the entire Constitution: 'Even the judges, with all
other officers of the Union will, as in the several States, be the
choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves."92
90. WILLS, supra note 50, at 101. Gordon Wood concluded that Madison still
considered "public opinion" to be the views of the elite as late as 1791. Wood,
supra note 72, at 125-26. Yet in The Federalist, Madison distinguished public rea-
son from public passion on the merits, not on class grounds. THE FEDERALIST No.
49, supra note 80, at 317 (James Madison).
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 80, at 296 (James Madison).
Madison's comment could help resolve notably volatile Tenth Amendment doctrine.
In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of state minimum wages in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Wirtz was overruled by National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (prohibiting congressional regulation of state
workers' wages and hours), which in turn was overruled nine years later in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991), and New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992), the Court undermined Garcia by distinguishing it; Garcia had been largely
decided on the ground that the Court could not develop any meaningful Tenth
Amendment distinctions, 469 U.S. at 537-39.
The Tenth Amendment activists have their own tradition. The Slaughter-House
Cases admitted the Court would have problems determining the appropriate doc-
trine: "[T]his line has never been very well defined in public opinion,"
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-82 (1872) (upholding monopoly
over slaughter-house locations). That lack of clarity did not preclude judicial re-
view. Id. at 82; see also Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 560 (1879) (con-
cluding that a state can move a county seat).
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 80, at 242 (James Madison). Even
relatively arcane issues were analyzed in terms of public opinion. Pinckney ex-
plained in 1800 why congressional immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
was so important:
[O]ur Constitution supposes no man ... to be infallible, but considers
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Yet some of the choices were designed to be quite remote. Ham-
ilton argued that independent Courts would protect the Consti-
tution from temporary majorities reflecting prevailing public
opinion: "This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from...
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community."' Lifetime
judicial tenure was essential: "[Otherwise] there would be too
great a disposition to consult popularity to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the
laws."94 Madison saw another advantage in giving the judi-
ciary the primary interpretive role: "The danger of disturbing
the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public
passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent
reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the
whole society."95
C. The Battle Between the Republicans and the Federalists
1. The Republicans'glorification of public opinion
The electoral process, which now determined leadership,
them all as mere men, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and
crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of
such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature for
their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opin-
ion.
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 71 (1800).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 80, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
94. Id. at 471.
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 80, at 315 (James Madison). During
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the First Congress considered requiring legisla-
tors to comply with the instructions of their electorate. Hartley successfully made
the Burkean argument that representatives should implement their own views
instead of being pure proxies for the majority will: "The right of instructing is lia-
ble to great abuses; it will generally be exercised in times of popular commo-
tion .... I have known, Sir, so many evils arise from adopting the popular opin-
ion of the moment, that I hope this government will be guarded against such an
influence." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 154 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
Jefferson defended the First Amendment because it served public opinion so
well: "[Tihe only security of all, is in a free press. The force of public opinion can-
not be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces
must be submitted to. It is necessary, to keep the waters pure." Letter from Thom-
as Jefferson to Marquis de la Fayette (Nov. 4, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 325 (HA. Washington ed., Philadelphia, JB. Lippincott & Co. 1871)
[hereinafter Jefferson to Fayette], quoted in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 n.3 (1943) (alteration in original) (holding that municipality cannot forbid
person to knock on doors to distribute religious handbills).
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undermined the pre-Revolutionary cohesion among the Ameri-
can elite. All political leaders needed votes in a country which
was turning increasingly democratic after the Revolution.96
Whatever other virtues democracy may have, it forces elites to
compete among themselves to gain the populace's favor.
Madison's distinction between reason and passion as good
and bad public opinion faded during the ensuing political con-
flict between the Federalists and the Republicans.17 The de-
bate between the Federalists and the Republicans became ever
more polarized, more Manichean. The partisan split between
the Republicans and Federalists revived class-based definitions
of public opinion. Jefferson summed up the Republican perspec-
tive when he explained why he preferred the nature of the
people to the elite: "[T]he sickly, weakly, timid man, fears the
people, and is a Tory by nature. The healthy, strong and bold,
cherishes them, is formed a Whig by nature."" Jefferson
trusted an educated populace more than any elite: "Every gov-
ernment degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe deposi-
tories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be
improved to a certain degree."99 This general perspective ex-
plains Jefferson's wariness of judicial review:
You seem... to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters
of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine
indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of
an oligarchy .... [Tiheir power the more dangerous as they
are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other func-
tionaries are, to the elective control.00
During the debate over the Alien and Sedition Act, Madi-
son, who had become a Republican, opposed the Federalist Act,
96. See WOOD, supra note 45; Wood, supra note 72.
97. See WOOD, supra note 45, at 363-64. For a thorough review of these polit-
ical conflicts, see STANLEY ELKINs & ERIc McK1TRIclK THE AGE OF FEDERALISM:
THE EARLY AMERIcAN REPUBuC, 1788-1800 (1993).
98. See WOOD, supra note 44, at 97 (quoting Jefferson to Fayette, supra note
95).
99. JEFFERSON, supra note 75, reprinted in 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
254 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1894).
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276, 277-78 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E.
Bergh eds., 1903). Lincoln read this letter during the Lincoln-Douglas debates. See
Wallace Mendelson, Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29
U. Cm. L. REv. 327 (1962).
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which heavily regulated political speech. Madison defended the
Virginia Resolutions' opposition to the Act as
expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect
than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflec-
tion. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are
carried into immediate effect by force. The former may lead to
a change in the legislative expression of the general
will-possibly, to a change in the opinion of the judiciary; the
latter enforces the general will, whilst that will and that
opinion continue unchanged. 10'
According to Madison, "judicial will," and the force that accom-
panies it, should never be completely insulated and isolated
from public opinion. Madison explicitly appealed to the public
for constitutional change: "The truth declared in the resolution
being established, the expediency of making the declaration at
the present day may safely be left to the temperate consider-
ation and candid judgment of the American public.""0 2 To Re-
publicans, opinion was everything. Thomas Cooper defiantly
accepted the costs of punishment for violating the Seditious
Libel Act: "I depend principally on my practice: that practice,
imprisonment will annihilate. Be it so. I have been accustomed
to make sacrifices to opinion, and I can make this." °3
Many early politicians believed that the public could rein-
terpret the Constitution. Jefferson relied on a "just" public
opinion to validate the Louisiana purchase, an exercise of pres-
idential power exceeding Jefferson's prior strict construction-
ism:
An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one
who should do it in cases for which they were not intended,
and which involved the most important consequences. The
line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the
good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw
himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his
motives." 4
101. JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341, 402 (Gallard Hunt ed., 1906).
102. Id. at 352.
103. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 643 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No.
14,865).
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 99, at 279, 281-82.
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Whether the politicians and leaders wanted it or not, the
Constitution quickly evolved into something far different than
the Framers intended. Henry Jones Ford contended that the
rapid evolution of the Electoral College was "conclusive evi-
dence of the ability of public opinion to modify the actual con-
stitution to any extent required." °5 Nor were such changes
limited to such basic structural questions as who should elect
the President. For example, the demand for paper money over-
whelmed the Framers' constitutional protections of specie.
0 6
John Pope used public opinion to legitimate the National
Bank.0 7 When President Andrew Jackson vetoed a subse-
quent National Bank bill, he also acknowledged public opinion:
"Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should
not: be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power
except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can
be considered as well settled."' Note that President Jackson
invoked a -corporate form of opinion: the views of the people
and the States.
The country's rapid changes precipitated a change in con-
sciousness among the elite. They worried less about personal
reputation and more about the overall will of the country. By
1817, "public opinion" had reached a novel status in American
consciousness; it was "that invisible guardian of honour-that
eagle-eyed spy on human actions-that inexorable judge of men
and manners-that arbiter, whom tears cannot appease, nor
105. HENRY J. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITIcs 161
(1914).
106. WOOD, supra note 45, at 316.
107. Pope defended the Bank by distinguishing between "individual liberty"
and "measures of general policy":
My reflections and practical observations on the Government incline me to
the opinion that, with regard to measures of general policy not assailing
individual liberty or right or the independence of any State, there is not
that danger to be apprehended from a liberal construction of the Consti-
tution which gentlemen seem to imagine. So long as the Government is
in the hands of the people, measures affecting the whole nation, if op-
pressive or inconvenient, will be resisted and corrected by the public
feeling and opinion.
22 ANNAIS OF CONG. 233-34 (1811) (Statement of Sen. John Pope). Eight years
later, Chief Justice Marshall would uphold the Bank partially because the Bank
did not affect "the great principles of Liberty," but only "the respective powers" of
the federal government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401
(1819).
108. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 1139, 1144-45
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
1037] 1063
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1063 1993
1064 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
ingenuity soften-and from whose terrible decisions there is no
appeal.""0 9 Public opinion was the "vital principle" that per-
meated America; it undermined all fixed principles, whether
they be rules of law or social mores."0 Tocqueville described
how public opinion and the rule of law uniquely reinforced each
other in American culture: "Those who wish to attack the laws
must consequently either change the opinion of the nation or
trample upon its decision.""'
2. The Federalist perspective
The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay,
summed up the Federalists' pessimistic view of the average
citizen, a premise that justified putting an enlightened elite at
the helm of power: "The mass of men... are neither wise nor
good, and virtue, like the other resources of a country, can only
be drawn to a point and exerted by strong circumstances ably
managed, or a strong government ably administered."" Led
by Hamilton, the Federalists did not rely on republican virtue
or approbation; they preferred the monarchial device of corrup-
tion, of providing financial benefits to those who supported the
government." 3 They also benefited from a post-Revolutionary
disillusionment: "[Tlhe people do not exhibit the virtue that is
necessary to support ac republican government."" 4 According
to one Federalist critic, North Carolina laws were "[t]he vilest
collection of trash ever :Framed by a legislative body."" 5
The Federalists quickly turned to the judiciary for protec-
tion of property,16  contract," 7  and the new written
109. Wood, supra note 72, at 125 (quoting WILLIAM CRAFTS, JR., AN ORATION
ON THE INFLUENCE OF MORAL CAUSES ON NATIONAL CHARACTER, DELIVERED BE-
FORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY, ON THEIR ANNIVERSARY 5-6 (Aug. 28, 1817)).
110. Id.
111. TOCQtEVILLE, supra note **, at 247.
112. WOOD, supra note 45, at 261 (quoting John Jay, quoted in DAVID H.
FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN
THE ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 7 (1965)).
113. WOOD, supra note 45, at 263 (quoting HELEN R. PINKNEY, CHRISTOPHER
GORE: FEDERALIST OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1758-1827, at 37 (1969)). Hamilton's "cor-
ruption" may have included more illegal techniques. His chief aide went to jail.
GORE VIDAI, Political Melodramas, in UNITED STATES; ESSAYS 1952-1992, at 854
(1993).
114. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AIERICAN HISTORY 132 (2d. ed. 1989).
115. Id.
116. Common law property rights also yielded to changes in technology and
ideology: "The onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way.
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constitutions. Chancellor James Kent lectured on the need for
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative actions: "If
public opinion was in every case to be presumed correct and
competent to be trusted, it is evident, there would have been no
need of original and fundamental limitations. But sad experi-
ence has sufficiently taught mankind, that opinion is not an
infallible standard of safety."11 Chancellor Kent, however,
did not give the judiciary the last word:
[Ilf the [judiciary] should at any time be prevailed upon to
substitute arbitrary will, to the exercise of a rational Judg-
ment, as it is possible it may do even in the ordinary course
of judicial proceeding, it is not left like [the legislature], to the
mere controul of public opinion. The Judges may be brought
before the tribunal of the Legislature, and tried, condemned,
and removed from office. 119
It should not be surprising that lawyers and courts led the
Federalists' efforts to constrain the democratic will. Tocqueville
described the inherently conservative, aristocratic instincts of
most lawyers:
Men who have made a special study of the laws derive
from this occupation certain habits of order, a taste for for-
malities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular con-
nection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to
the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the
multitude.120
The law is made for the times, and will be made or modified by them." Lexington
& O.R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 309 (1839) (holding railroad not a
nuisance).
117. In his famous argument in Dartmouth College opposing a state law which
modified an existing contract with Dartmouth College, Daniel Webster said:
It will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these insti-
tutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations
of political opinions. If the franchise may be at any time taken away, or
impaired, the property also may be taken away, or its use perverted.
TiOTHY FARRAR, REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
AGAINST WIIAM H. WOODWARD 282-83 (Boston, 1819).
118. JAMES KENT, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE TO A COURSE OF LAW LECTURES
(1794), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA,
1760-1805, at 936, 942 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). Kent
equated public opinion with faction: "The Courts of Justice which are organized
with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence of Faction."
Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 943-44.
120. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 273. A.V. Dicey observed that judges are
older than most of their contemporaries. Their views will usually lag two gener-
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The Federalists heeded Hamilton's vision in The Federalist
Papers, interpreting constitutions and protecting vested proper-
ty rights under "fixed principles" of law that only could be di-
vined and applied by judges.'2 '
The Federalists did not completely exclude public opinion
from their constitutional analysis. During the debate over the
Alien and Sedition Act, the Federalist Massachusetts legisla-
ture endorsed the Act, using the rhetoric of public opinion:
"[The freedom of the press] is a security for the rational use
and not the abuse of the press-of which courts of law, the
juries, and people will judge; this right is not infringed but con-
firmed and established by the late act of Congress."" The
Resolution's conclusion was equally forceful, linking constitu-
tional interpretation to public opinion manifested through elec-
tion returns: 'The legislature further declare, that in the fore-
going sentiments they have expressed the general opinion of
their constituents, who have not only acquiesced without com-
plaint in those particular measures of the Federal Government,
but have given their explicit approbation by reelecting those
men who voted for the adoption of them.""~
How could Republicans and Federalists applaud and ap-
peal to public opinion during conflicts like the Alien and Sedi-
tion Act? To a large degree, they had two different audiences in
mind: The Republicans referred to the "whole people" while the
Federalists tended to value the views of "those philosophical
and patriotic citizens who cultivate their reason.""m The Re-
publicans had the last word. They won the next election and re-
pealed the Act.
The debate between the Republicans and the Federalists
over the primacy of public opinion was not limited to political
power. Gordon Wood has explained how the Alien and Sedition
Act, which had made "truth" a defense, triggered an
ations behind the times, because people tend to reflect the most powerful thinking
of their immediate forefathers. DICEY, supra note 43, at 369.
121. WOOD, supra note 45, at 325.
122. MASSACHUSi'rS RESOLUTIONS IN REPLY TO VIRGINIA (1799), reprinted in
JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 136 (1991) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 138.
124. WOOD, supra note 45, at 363 (quoting Letter from James Madison (Mar.
7, 1790)). Gordon Wood also described a social component to the dispute: [1M]ost
Revolutionary writers, at the outset at least, presumed the existence of these uni-
versal principles, of right behavior and expected a uniformity of response, suppos-
ing that their audience either was, or would like to be, part of that restricted
circle of men of good taste and judgment." Wood, supra note 72, at 109.
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epistemological disagreement over the meaning of "truth":
While the Federalists clung to the traditional assumption that
truth was constant and universal and capable of being discov-
ered by enlightened and reasonable men, their Republican
opponents argued that opinions about government and rulers
were many and diverse and the truth of such opinions could
not be determined simply by judges and members of juries, no
matter how educated and reasonable such men might be. 2
The dispute between the Republicans and the Federalists
over public opinion can be exaggerated. No American politician
seeking elected office could contemptuously dismiss the public
and remain in power. Although his views were unique at the
time, Federalist James Wilson combined the Hamiltonian com-
mitment to a strong central government with the Jeffersonian
belief in majority rule, anticipating the ultimate outcome of the
Federalist-Republican debate. Only a few bitter Federalists
withdrew from the public arena during the early nineteenth
century.
127
Such divergent views reveal the inherent difficulty of de-
termining the appropriate role of the public in constitutional
theory. This rich discourse also demonstrates that the early
political leaders, including conservative Federalist judges, did
not have a one-dimensional idea of how to organize their novel
republic. They groped toward their new form of government.
Most leaders believed the public had to participate in the evo-
lution of the Constitution. Nobody knew how or how much. But
many changes took place in the early years; the public ignored
the Framers' views on the electoral college, the prohibition
against paper money, but legitimated rival political parties."
Admittedly, the rate of constitutional change diminished. But
myriad constitutions could have emerged out of that single
text; the courts and the public joined together to create the
basic system that we continue to use today.
125. WOOD, supra note 45, at 362.
126. Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1,
4-5 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson believed that all three branches of the
federal government had to be premised upon popular consent, not command. Id. at
24-25, 47.
127. James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in THE
WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. (1804), reprinted in 1 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 126, at 97, 119.
128. See, e.g., RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM (1969).
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D. Public Opinion and the Early Courts
Both State and Federal Courts sought and needed public
support to prevail against the more powerful elected branches.
In 1788, the Virginia State Legislature passed a statute in-
creasing the responsibilities of many judges. "The judges there-
for sent a 'Respectful Remonstrance'... asldng that 'the pres-
ent infraction of the constitution may be remedied by the legis-
lature themselves.' "129 The judges said if the legislature re-
fused to act, "they see no other alternative for a decision be-
tween the legislature and judiciary than an appeal to the peo-
ple." 3 ° After the legislature refused to change the law, the
judges made that appeal by resigning. The legislature capitu-
lated, amending the statute and reappointing the judges.13" '
Like Justice Souter in Casey, early judges used public
opinion to justify judicial review. Several early courts developed
Hamilton's argument that the judiciary was the intermediary
between the people and their elected representatives:
This constitution is sanctioned by the consent and acquies-
cence of the people for seventeen years; and it is admitted by
the almost universal opinion of the people, by the repeated
adjudications of the courts of this commonwealth, and by very
many declarations of the legislature itself, to be of superior
authority to any opposing act of the legislature.'32
The judges envisioned a dialogue between the judiciary and the
public. They wrote their opinions to persuade both the litigat-
ing parties and the public of the correctness of their decisions.
In other words, the courts initially interpret constitutions, but
the public could oppose particular adjudications and statutes,
as they did with the Alien and Sedition Act. This process ulti-
mately extended beyond discourse. Many judges accepted the
Republican argument that the people, not the judiciary, are the
129. POWELL, supra note 122, at 73.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 72-73. This early episode confrms Justice Souter's argument that
the judiciary depends on widespread public support.
132. Kamper v. Hawkins, 8 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 37 (1793). Judicial opinions
and legislative acts can increase in authority due to the passage of time and the
validation by public opinion: [Tlhe constitution, and the subsequent acts of the
convention . . . [b]oth depend upon the acquiescence of the people, as the conven-
tion was not deputed to make the constitution; or to pass laws under it; and,
therefore, if the people acquiesced under the constitution, they acquiesced in the
interpretation also." Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 185 (1804).
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ultimate guardians of liberty."3
The federal courts initially did not fulfill Hamilton's ex-
pectations that the unelected courts would effectively constrain
the elected branches.1" In 1801, Chief Justice John Jay re-
fused President Adams' reappointment because "under a sys-
tem so defective" the Court would never "obtain the energy,
weight and dignity which were essential to its affording due
support to the National Government, nor [would it] acquire the
public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the
justice of the nation, it should possess." "
The Court gradually asserted itself against the two more
powerful branches. Attorney General Caesar Rodney published
a letter he wrote to President Jefferson complaining about a
judicial decision, Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston,"'6 that
undermined Jefferson's embargo. Justice Johnson, the author of
Gilchrist, turned to the newspapers to sway public opinion:
That the president should have consulted that officer upon a
legal subject [in private], is perfectly consistent with the rela-
tion subsisting between [the executive and judicial depart-
ments] .... But when that opinion is published to the
world... an act so unprecedented in the history of executive
conduct could be intended for no other purpose than to secure
the public opinion on the side of the executive and in opposi-
133. But, should usurpation rear its head; should the unnatural case ever
occur, when the representatives of the people should betray their
constituents, we are referred, for consolation and remedy, to the pow-
er and vigilance of the state governments; to publick opinion; to the
active agency of the people in their elections; to that perpetual depen-
dence on the people, which is the primary controul on the govern-
ment ....
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 619 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
Justice Chase asserted that the courts were the primary guardians of liberty:
"If your constitution was destroyed, so long as the judiciary department remained
free and uncontrolled, the liberties of the people would not be endangered. Suffer
your courts of judicature to be destroyed: there is an end to your liberties." United
States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 640-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
134. Hamilton complained in 1802: "I am still labouring to prop the frail and
worthless fabric [of the Constitution] .... What can I do better than withdraw
from the scene? Every day proves to me more and more that this American world
was not made for me." FORREST McDoNALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY
356 (1979). Gordon Wood has described how many other early leaders, including
Jefferson, became discouraged about the fate of America by the end of their lives.
WOOD, supra note 45, at 367-68.
135. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 23-24 (1919)
(quoting John Jay).
136. 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420).
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1069 1993
1070 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
tion to the judiciary. 37
The Court needed the public to support its power to ignore
the public. In 1810, the Supreme Court stated in Fletcher v.
Peck that judicial interpretations of the relevant text must
prevail over public opinion: "Would the act be null, whatever
might be the wish of the nation, or would its obligation or nul-
lity depend upon the public sentiment?"'38 In Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, Justice Johnson dissented because the
Court may have satisfied "the public mind" but failed to comply
with the Constitution when it upheld a congressional law giv-
ing the Bank of United States jurisdiction to sue in federal
circuit courts.3 9
From the very beginning, Justices have had two different
conceptions of their role. Some believe that the Court interacts
with the country, while Others believe the Court must insulate
itself from outside pressures. Some Justices, like Justice John-
son, who wrote Hudson4 ° and dissented in Osborn,' ap-
pear to hold both viewpoints at different times. Justice Johnson
thus personified the two competing sub-traditions (incorporat-
ing public opinion and being hostile to public opinion) that con-
stitute the Supreme Court's approach.
Chief Justice Marshall increased the Supreme Court's
power by synthesizing Republican and Federalist thinking.'
He sought to separate law from politics but remained attuned
to the country's political :mood when applying that distinction:
[Marshall] has a strong attachment to popularity but indis-
posed to sacrifice to it his integrity; hence it is that he is
disposed on all popular subjects to feel the public pulse and
hence results indecision and an obsession of doubt ....
Doubts suggested by him create in feeble minds those which
are irremovable. He is disposed. . . to express the great re-
spect for the sovereign people and to quote their opinions as a
137. WILLIAM JOHNSON, REPLY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL CEASAR RODNEY'S AT-
TACK ON HIS DECISION IN THE GILCHRiST CASE (1808), reprinted in 1 THE GROWTH
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 563-64 (William M. Goldsmith ed., 1974).
138. 10 U.S. (6. Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (prohibiting State from rescinding legis-
lative land grants made by prior, fraudulent legislature).
139. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (holding that
Bank of United States' charter gives jurisdiction to United States circuit courts).
140. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871.
142. Many Federalists did not think Chief Justice Marshall was sufficiently
committed to their, ideology. POWELL, supra note 122, at 173.
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matter of truth. 43
Chief Justice Marshall systematically sought the public appro-
bation and support that Chief Justice Jay believed the Court
could never achieve." Chief Justice Marshall's careful,
pathbreaking opinion in Marbury v. Madison obtained signifi-
cant judicial power over both the President and Congress with-
out forcing either elected branch to counter-attack. 45
Chief Justice Marshall did not limit himself to his opinions
to convince the public; he wrote letters to newspapers to per-
suade the populace of the validity of McCulloch v. Mary-
land, '4 which upheld the Second National Bank. 4 ' He
began McCulloch by observing that the elected branches had
created such banks in the past. His constitutional jurispru-
dence was formed not only by theory but also by practice. Chief
Justice Marshall's successes led to Tocqueville's observation
that the American public had ratified another fundamental
question of constitutional law: "Americans have acknowledged
143. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (May 12, 1800), in 3 THE
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RuFus KING 236-39 (Charles R. King ed., 1896).
144. Chief Justice Marshall eventually achieved his goal. In a dissent to
Marshall's opinion permitting Georgia to expel the Cherokee Indians, Justice
Baldwin observed: "The opinion of this court is of high authority in itself; and the
judge who delivers it [Marshall] has a support as strong in moral influence over
public opinion, as any human tribunal can impart." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 32 (1831) (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
145. Marshall held that the Executive acted unconstitutionally by depriving
Marbury of his "vested legal right" to his commission but that Marbury could not
prevail because Congress had unconstitutionally expanded the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803); see
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992).
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
147. See generally JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). Given its abstract, protean nature, the concept of pub-
lic opinion is putty in the hands of a skillful judge, particularly a relatively non-
partisan judge like Chief Justice Marshall. Depending upon the issue, Chief Justice
Marshall emphasized different relationships between the people, the elected branch-
es, and the Court. When validating an act, he emphasized that the Legislature is
the agent of people and a co-interpreter of the Constitution. For example, in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall
began his defense of the National Bank by referring to prior legislative acts, not to
constitutional text. When Chief Justice Marshall decided that an Act ran counter
to the Constitution, he ignored existing public opinion as reflected through legisla-
tion and the Legislature as the people's agent. Instead, the Court became the in-
termediary on behalf of the people. For example, neither the people nor their rep-
resentatives could disturb the "vested legal right" of Marbury to his commission,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803), or of innocent holders in
due course, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132-33 (1810).
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the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution
rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted
them not to apply such laws as may appear to them to be un-
constitutional." 4 '
Although Justice Story was far more of a Federalist than
Chief Justice Marshall, he sometimes incorporated public opin-
ion into constitutional interpretation.'49 In Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, Story extrapolated, at least in part, his constitutional
interpretation of the meaning of Article III from an existing
congressional statute: "[This distinction has] been brought into
view in deference to the legislative opinion, which has so long
acted upon, and enforced, this distinction."'5 0 Observe that in
McCulloch, Hudson and Hunter's Lessee, the Supreme Court
believed that ten to twenty years was a sufficient length of
time for judicial and/or public interpretations of the Constitu-
tion to become crystallize d.' 5'
The Framers designed the Constitution to protect private
property from pro-debtor, majoritarian legislatures.'52 The
Supreme Court eventuall.y fulfilled Hamilton's hopes of being
the primary guarantor by significantly immunizing private
property and contract rights from public opinion through the
doctrine of "vested legal rights."'53 For example, in Fletcher v.
148. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 100 (emphasis added).
149. Justice Story described the abortive constitution that the philosopher John
Locke drafted for Caroline in 1669 in a way that summarizes this article's thesis:
Perhaps in the annals of the world there is not to be found a more
wholesome lesson of the utter folly of all efforts to establish forms of
governments upon mere theory; and of the dangers of legislation without
consulting the habits, manners, feelings, and opinion of the people, upon
which they are to operate.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58
(reprint ed. 1987) (1833).
150. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816) (holding
that state supreme court must follow decision of United States Supreme Court).
Professor Amar partially premised his "two-tiered" theory of Article III jurisdiction
upon Story's arguments in Martin. Alchil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
Iff: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210"
(1985).
151. In Casey, Justice Souter partially gave Roe u. Wade more authority be-
cause it had endured for almost twenty years and many women had relied on it.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992).
152. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1913). For a discussion of the historiography that followed
from Beard's thesis, see WILLS, supra note 73, at xiv-xvi.
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Peck,i" Chief Justice Marshall protected allegedly innocent,
third-party purchasers of legislative land grants from a state
legislature which sought to revoke the grants due to prior leg-
islative fraud.'55 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the parlia-
mentary sovereignty argument that public opinion was the only
constraint on governmental alterations of existing eleemosy-
nary corporate charters in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward." In his concurrence in that case, Justice Story
made an argument Justice Scalia would appreciate: "I have en-
deavored to keep my steps... under the guidance of authority
and principle. It is not for judges to listen to the voice of per-
suasive eloquence or popular appeal." 57
The constitutionalization of the common law did not com-
pletely isolate private "vested legal rights" from public opinion.
The common law had been formed by a combination of "learned
men," judges, and public opinion:158 "[W]e must suppose, that
the framers of our constitution were intimately acquainted with
the writings of those wise and learned men, whose treatises on
the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on
the subjects of obligation and contract."5 9 If the common law
is formed by an interaction between "learned men" and public
opinion,"6 and if the Constitution protects the common law,
cannot public opinion change the common law and thus the
Constitution?. 61
154. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
155. Id. at 132-33.
156. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643 (1819). "According to the theory of the Brit-
ish constitution, their parliament is omnipotent. To annul corporate rights might
give a shock to public opinion, which that government has chosen to avoid; but its
power is not questioned." Id. Chief Justice Marshall also wrote that the public
opinion was the only effective monitor of abuses by corporate officers: "Should this
reasoning ever prove erroneous in a particular case, public opinion, as has been
stated at the bar, would correct the institution." Id. at 650.
157. Id. at 713 (Story, J., concurring). Justice Story defended "principles" as a
necessary aspect of the virtue of judicial certainty. STORY, supra note 149, at 175.
158. See JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAw
5-6 (1884) (equating the common law with the "popular will").
159. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353-54 (1827) (holding that
congressional bankruptcy power does not exclude states from also regulating
bankruptcies).
160. CARTER, supra note 158, at 6.
161. More particularly, public opinion has been able to change the definition of
nuisance over the centuries, incorporating new forms of injury, including environ-
mental damage. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992) (holding that coastal regulation reducing property to no economic worth was
a "taking," unless it constitutes a nuisance under background principles of state
1037] 1073
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, the rule of law
appeared triumphant."2 While still a lawyer, Abraham Lin-
coln told a crowd in 1838:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher
to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to
violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and
never to tolerate their violation by others.
... [Alithough bad laws, if they exist, should be re-
pealed as soon as possible, still while they continue in force,
for the sake of example, they should be religiously ob-
served."s
In the early years of the Republic, Americans temporarily man-
aged to combine the cult of public opinion with their belief in
the rule of law. All common, statutory, and constitutional laws
ultimately expressed the people's will. As Tocqueville made
clear throughout his famous study of American society, public
opinion, defined in the modern sense as the overall mood of the
country, completely prevailed.
nuisance laws).
162. The debate over the relationship between law and public opinion extended
beyond constitutional law. State courts transformed common law by preserving
some desirable Blackstonian principles but changing others. See, e.g., MORTON J.
HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (Oxford University
Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter HORWIT, TRANSFORMATION 1780-1860]. Such legal
flexibility undercut the codification movement, which reflected the belief that the
public could better express their will through statutes than by accepting judicial in-
terpretations of common law:
Statutes, enacted by the legislature, speak the public voice. Legislators,
with us, are not only chosen because they possess the public confidence,
but after their election, they are strongly influenced by public feeling.
They must sympathize with the public, and express its will: should they
fail to do so, the next year witnesses their removal from office, and oth-
ers are selected to be the organs of the popular sentiment.
ROBERT RANTOUL, JR., Oration at Scituate, in MEMOIRS, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 251, 280 (Luther Hamilton ed., Boston, John P. Jewett &
Co. 1854).
Even common law adjudication included assessment of public views. In his in-
famous concurrence precluding women from practicing law because of the "law of
the Creator," Justice Bradley referred to the common law: "So firmly fixed was this
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that
system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her
husband." Bradwell v. Illinois, 842 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
163. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address
Before the Springfield Young Men's Lyceum, (1838), reprinted in THE POITICAL
THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16-17 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967).
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Where do the three Casey opinions that considered public
opinion fit in this ideological continuum? Justice Souter sound-
ed like a Federalist when he wrote that the Court gained its
prestige by deciding cases using "fixed principles." But his
conscious courting of public opinion places him with moderates
like Madison. The country's early history also confirms his
observation that the Supreme Court needs popular support. By
dismissing public opinion as an annoyance, Chief Justice
Rehnquist resembled those embittered Federalists who with-
drew from the public arena because they were disgusted by the
triumph of the public.' Justice Scalia made the Federalist
philosophical argument by praising "objective" law. Both dis-
senters can find comfort in the dissent in Osborn, just as Jus-
tice Souter can find support in Hudson. In fact, the real tradi-
tion is the fluctuation of the Court between the two approach-
es. After all, Justice Johnson wrote the dissent in Osborn and
the majority opinion in Hudson.
E. Public Opinion and Slavery
No issue divided the United States as much as slavery."
In the course of sending slaves back to their captors, Chief
Justice Marshall observed in The Antelope: 'That the course of
opinion on the slave trade should be unsettled, ought to excite
no surprise. The Christian and civilized nations of the world,
with whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in
it."' Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall believed that the
public's views were changing: "Public sentiment has, in both
countries, kept pace with the measures of government; and the
opinion is extensively, if not universally entertained, that this
unnatural traffic ought to be suppressed."'6 7 Justice Baldwin,
who struggled with the slavery question, pitted judicial "princi-
ple" against current public opinion:
To consider [slaves] as persons merely, and not property, is,
in my settled opinion, the first step towards a state of things
to be avoided only by a firm adherence to the fundamental
principles of the state and federal governments, in relation to
this species of property. If the first step taken is a mistaken
164. Wood, supra note 72, at 119.
165. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68 (1872).
166. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-15 (1825) (requiring slaves
from forfeited ship to be returned to their masters).
167. Id at 116.
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one, the successive ones will be fatal to the whole system. I
have taken my stand on the only position which, in my judg-
ment, is impregnable; and feel confident in its strength, how-
ever it may be assailed in public opinion, here or
elsewhere."
Part of the problem was that each side could assert a basic
legal principle: liberty competed against property.169
The courts frequently had to decide the legal status of
alleged fugitive slaves."7° Leonard Levy described how a
small but very aggressive minority in Massachusetts effectively
challenged the administration of fugitive slave laws. 17' In
such a context, "public opinion" became the views and actions
of a few zealous advocates who may or may not have reflected
the majority of the populace. To a certain degree, the American
form of government needs the consent of minorities as well as
the majority. A profoundly alienated or angry minority can
influence policy as much as the more passive majority. Justice
Story tried to solve the problem in Prigg v. Pennsylvania by
releasing the states from any obligation to return fugitive
slaves: "[I]t would be left to the mere comity of the states to act
as they should please; and would depend for its security upon
the changing course of public opinion, the mutations of public
policy, and the general adaptations of remedies for purposes
strictly according to the lex fori."172 Story upheld Congress's
fugitive slave act by combining current public acceptance with
168. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 517 (1841) (Baldwin, J., dis-
senting) (avoiding decision on state constitutional provision banning slave importa-
tion because state did not pass activating legislation). Baldwin concluded that
states could ban slavery but could not exclude slaves from out of state if slavery
were continued within the state.
169. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 421 (1815) (holding that neutral
may hire an armed belligerent vessel to ship goods).
170. According to one Supreme Court advocate, hostile public opinion negated
state enforcement of state fugitive slave laws:
It is true that the legislature of the state of New York, several years
ago, enacted a law authorizing the governor of the state, in his discretion,
to surrender fugitives from foreign countries. But public opinion has lately
manifested itself strongly against the validity of the law; and the gover-
nor, during the last year, refused to act under it.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 554 (1840) (argument of counsel) (equal-
ly divided Court dismissing habeas corpus petition).
171. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 72-108 (1957).
172. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842) (freeing fugitive
slave catcher for violating state law).
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the views of Framers and ratifiers:
This very acquiescence... of the highest state functionaries,
is a most decisive proof of the universality of the opinion that
the act is founded in a just construction of the Constitution;
independent of the vast influence which it ought to have as a
contemporaneous exposition of the provisions, by those who
were its immediate framers, or intimately connected with its
adoption.'73
Story's argument coexists somewhat uncomfortably with his
consultation of the "legislative mind" in Hunter's Lessee and his
refusal to consider public opinion in Dartmouth College. For
Story, the significance of public opinion varied with the issue.
Until Casey, no Justice discussed the role of public opinion
more fully than Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.1 74 Taney
contrasted the "public opinion" at the time of the Framers with
public opinion at the time of the case. Current public opinion
was constitutionally irrelevant:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public
opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the
civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce
the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more lib-
eral construction in their favor than they were intended to
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an
argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal
called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed
unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by
which it may be amended."
Turning to historical public opinion, Taney claimed that
the entire country considered blacks to be inferior during the
Revolution. Nobody intended the Declaration of Independence's
phrase "all Men are created equal" 6 to apply to blacks: "It is
difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in
relation to that unfortunate race."17 Racial discrimination
persisted in all parts of the country during the ratification of
173. Id. at 620-21.
174. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding slave is not
American citizen and Congress cannot ban slavery from Territories).
175. Id. at 426.
176. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
177. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
10371 1077
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the Constitution."8 Even the disappearance of the slave trade
in the North was not attributable to public opinion: "[T]his
change had not been produced by any change of [public] opin-
ion in relation to this race; but because it was discovered, from
experience, that slave labor was unsuited to the climate and
productions of these States."' 9 According to Taney, these
facts determined the meaning of the Constitution: 'We refer to
these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opin-
ions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that
day spoke and acted."8
As has been discussed elsewhere, Taney's grasp of history
was quite faulty. 8' Many Revolutionary pamphleteers had
extended their egalitarian analysis to castigate American slav-
ery.8 2  Eighteenth-century Pennsylvania Quakers led the
fight against the slave trade.'" Thomas Jefferson, author of
the Declaration of Independence, expressed racist sentiments,
but he also believed blacks had equal liberties.M Better his-
tory probably would not have changed the outcome. Taney
could have accurately distinguished such progressive views as
178. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible
marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or
spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or
the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.
This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the
Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions
and language.
Id. at 410.
179. Id. at 412.
180. Id. at 409; see also Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 351, 376
(1874) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that state can release lien on railroad).
181. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgot-
ten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 37 (1993); Herbert J. Storing, Slavery and the
Moral Foundations of the American Republic, in MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AM.
ERICAN REPUBLIC 214-33 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1979).
Taney's history was controversial at the time. One of the lawyers in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania had stated more than a decade earlier: 'Before the close of the Revo-
lution, however, public opinion in the northern section of the country, had materi-
ally changed with regard to the policy and humanity of [slavery]." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 563 (1842). Chief Justice Taney had a different view: "The number [of blacks]
that had been emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those
held in slavery; and they were identified in the public mind with the race to
which they belonged." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411. In addition to criticiz-
ing Taney's history, Justice Curtis relied on learned men to limit slavery to posi-
tive law because it was "contrary to natural right," a concept "agreed [to] by all
writers on the subject." Id. at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
182. BAILYN, supra note 57, at 232-46.
183. DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED 601-03 (1989).
184. JEFFERSON, supra note 75, at 163.
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minority sentiments, even in the North, at the times of the
Revolution and Constitutional ratification.
Taney's one-sided history demonstrates the perils judges
face in assessing public opinion of any form, at any time. It is
hard for Justices to determine the views of the Framers, the
mood of the country at the time the relevant text was ratified,
or the country's opinion at the time of a decision. Given their
tendency to make everything in their opinions converge toward
one seemingly inevitable outcome, Justices tend to get nonjudi-
cial facts wrong. Even if Justices do get such facts right, they
will (or at least should) rely on existing historiography, which
is far from immutable.
Nevertheless, Taney's analysis demonstrates that the
Court must determine at least one form of public opinion in
every constitutional law case. The Court should determine why
the general populace, not just some articulate, vocal Framers,
agreed to the constitutional text in question. If the Justices iso-
late themselves from large segments of history by refusing to
determine public consciousness at the time of the ratification of
a given text, they eliminate a major constraint and grounding
factor that regulates law.
No Justice has claimed that history is so unknowable that
it is constitutionally irrelevant. Consequently, any argument
against the Court's use of public opinion, based upon judicial
ignorance or institutional incompetence, proves too much. As-
suming the Court can begin to assess public opinion in 1789, it
has a similar ability to discern the current public mood. The
Court admittedly has limited competence to assess any form of
public opinion, as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
noted in Casey, but the Court has even less capacity to deter-
mine public beliefs two hundred years ago, particularly the
beliefs of the average citizen. Current public opinion may be an
inappropriate variable in constitutional adjudication, but the
argument against it must extend beyond judicial competence,
because that argument also undermines any judicial use of
history and tradition, favorite arguments of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
Perhaps the Court should only try to ascertain the
Framers' views, not public opinion at the time of text's ratifica-
tion. But that interpretation undermines the fundamental
premise that the Constitution reflects the sovereign will of the
people, not the Framers. By consulting only the Framers, the
Court would be constitutionalizing the elite views of the politi-
1037] 1079
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cal leadership. The Court is supposed to be an intermediary for
the people, not for the drafters. After all, judicial review is
partially premised upon the argument that the Court is enforc-
ing the views of the supermajority against, the People, the
temporary majority. More practically, the body politic would be
very wary of ever committing to a constitutional text if they
knew their opinions were going to be completely ignored once
the text was put into place.
The Court needs to consult general public opinion to deter-
mine the Framers' views. After all, the Framers self-consciously
took public opinion into consideration. Thaddeus Stevens, for
example, complained about the Joint Resolution that became
the Fourteenth Amendment: "This proposition is not all that
the committee desired. It. falls far short of my wishes, but it
fulflls my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the
present state of public opinion." 8 ' Making such determina-
tions will not be easy. The Supreme Court can learn much
about widespread public opinion by consulting such works as
Professor Fischer's Albion's Seed, which not only captures the
everyday life of America before the revolution but also demon-
strates that American culture and politics were influenced by
four radically different conceptions of liberty."8 6
Fortunately, the Dred Scott Court did not have the last
word on slavery.'87 Abraham Lincoln, who had earlier glori-
fied the rule of law, became a Humean political analyst, assert-
ing that "[o]ur government rests in public opinion. Whoever can
change public opinion, can change the government, practically,
just so much."1 s While President, Lincoln justified his ag-
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866), cited in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112, 175 (1970) (upholding federal law setting minimum age for feder-
al elections but striking down minimum age for state elections).
186. FISCHER, supra note 183, at 782.
187. The subsequent furor over admitting Kansas as a slave state may have
been a more divisive event than Dred Scott. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERI-
CA IN 1857 (1990).
188. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Chicago, Ill. (Dec. 10, 1856), in 2 THE WRIT-
INGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 284 (Arthur B. Lapsey, Constitutional ed. 1923). The
Lincoln-Douglas debates, which focused on slavery and Dred Scott, reflected the
building tensions between law and public opinion concerning slavery. For Douglas,
law was supreme, perhaps even to the point of stifling subsequent criticism: "As a
lawyer, I feel at liberty to appear before the Court and controvert any principle of
law while the question is pending before the tribunal; but when the decision is
made, my private opinion, your opinion, all other opinions must yield to the majes-
ty of that authoritative adjudication." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas at Chicago
(July 9, 1858), in TIMEs, July 11, 1958, reprinted in PAUL M. ANGLE, CREATED
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gressive tactics against the Southern rebellion, such as jailing
hostile Maryland legislators and other dissidents, because the
public would retain the last word about the validity of these ac-
tions through the electoral and impeachment processes. At
critical points, constitutional trust is more important than
constitutional law.189 Ralph Waldo Emerson described with
admiration how Lincoln patiently waited for the right moment
to free all slaves behind rebel lines:
The extreme moderation with which the President advanced
to his design-his long-avowed expectant policy, as if he chose
to be strictly the executive of the best public sentiment of the
country, waiting only till it should be unmistakably jro-
nounced-so fair a mind that none ever listened so patiently
to such extreme varieties of opinion.""9
EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 20 (1958).
Lincoln replied that he did not advocate resistance to the actual Dred Scott
decision; he opposed extending the decision beyond the actual parties. "[Douglas]
would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of
government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of
property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Spring-
field (July 17, 1858), in ILL. ST. J., July 20-21, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, at
78. Lincoln observed that "a vast portion of the American people . . . look upon
[slavery] as a vast moral evil." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Chicago (July 10,
1858), in DAILY DEMOCRAT, July 13, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, at 35.
Douglas attacked Lincoln's nonviolent attempt to use public opinion to amend
judicial constitutional doctrine: "Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a
President who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred Scott decision ....
It is a proposition to make that court the corrupt, unscrupulous tool of a political
party." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas. at Springfield (July 17, 1858), in ILL. ST.
REG., July 19, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, at 57.
Frederick Douglass believed that the existing constitutional text was not an
obstacle to manumission:
I have much confidence in the instincts of the slaveholders. They see that
the Constitution will afford slavery no protection when it shall cease to
be administered by the slaveholders. They see, moreover, that if there is
once a will in the people of America to abolish slavery, there is no word,
no syllable in the Constitution to forbid that result.
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Anti-Slavery?, in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 478 (P. Foner ed.,
1950).
189. "[T]he constitution is different, in its application in cases of Rebellion or
Invasion, involving the Public Safety, from what it is in times of profound peace
and public security ... 2' Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Ohio Democrats (June
29, 1863), in POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 261 (Richard N. Current
ed., 1967). According to Garry Wills, Lincoln never tried to grasp more power than
was legally available under the Constitution to suppress the Rebellion. GARRY
WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETYSBURG 139-40 (1992).
190. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Emancipation Proclamation (1862), in SE-
LECTED WRITINGS 886, quoted in WILLS, supra note 189, at 104.
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Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation echoed Jefferson's Decla-
ration of Independence in its plea to all of mankind, to history:
"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice,
warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke
the considerate judgment of mankind ....""'  Lincoln's even-
tual triumphs, including the Thirteenth Amendment's elimina-
tion of slavery, were high-water marks of Republican participa-
tory politics. Public opinion, combined with public will, had
transformed the Constitution into a more centralized form of
government with the power to combat all forms of racism.192
The tree of liberty had been rewatered with patriotic blood.
Underneath public opinion lay public will-black and white
Northern foot-soldiers' dogged determination.'93
F. Public Opinion and the Post-Civil War Court:
The Domestication of Public Opinion
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court domesticated pub-
lic opinion. It "scientifically" developed an elaborate, formal set
of doctrines that allegedly transcended not only the views of
the people but also the personal views of the Justices. 94 For
example, the Court held that antitrust laws could not apply to
a massive sugar monopoly because the "manufacturing" of
sugar was not "interstate commerce."195 Perhaps such artific-
es, premised upon a strong conception of individual economic
liberty that repudiated slavery, were necessary healing devic-
es. "'96 It may have been time for the Court to appear to depo-
191. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THi EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (1863). See gen-
erally MARK E. NEELY JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY (1991) (evaluating Lincoln's civil
liberties record during the Civil War). Not everyone was pleased with Lincoln's
assertion of vast power, whether allegedly under the Constitution or not. Former
Justice Curtis criticized pro-Lincoln newspaper assertions "that 'nobody cares'
whether a great public act of the President of the United States is in conformity
with or is subversive of the supreme law of the land." 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN
ROBBINS CURTIs L.L.D. 332 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879).
192. Conservatives like Justice Scalia would argue that the new Constitutional
settlement precludes the use of virtually all racial categories.
193. See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CwnVI
WAR ERA (1988).
194. See David D. Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science (Address
at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21, 1859), in
1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
517-33 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
195. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding antitrust
laws not applicable to manufacturing of sugar).
196. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
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liticize the Constitution in particular and the legal system in
general, both having been battered by the slavery debate.'97
Hundreds of thousands had been killed to resolve these con-
stitutional disputes, while politicians continued to wave the
"Bloody Shirt" even after the War to provoke sectional con-
flict.198
One function of the Supreme Court is the preservation of
social order. To achieve this end, the Court must determine the
public mood, develop a mode of rhetoric that the public finds
acceptable, and make decisions that the public at least toler-
ates. The postbellum Court's pseudo-scientific jurisprudence
apparently fooled, or at least satisfied, enough people so the
country could turn from the contentious issue of constitutional
interpretation to the far less divisive task of making money. In
other words, Langdellian formalistic jurisprudence had some
salutary effects for twenty to thirty years after the Civil War.
Supreme Court decisions like In re Debs,'99 which per-
mitted the federal courts to fight unions with labor injunctions,
and Lochner v. New York,2"' which opposed legislative regula-
tion of the market by striking down a state law limiting bakers'
working hours, revealed the limits, both conceptually and prac-
tically, of the Court's formalistic ideology.
By self-consciously ignoring public opinion, the Court
missed a fundamental change in political consciousness. The
debate over the Lochner jurisprudence dwelled on the appro-
priate role of public opinion. Dissenters like Justice Brandeis,
who opposed economic substantive due process, expressly ar-
gued that the Court improperly excluded public opinion. Con-
versely, when the Lochner-style Justices ended up on the losing
side during the 1930s, they criticized the new majorities for
capitulating to public opinion.
More recently, Justice Scalia seeks an objective Constitu-
tion governed by fixed legal principles. He has tried to weed
public opinion out of constitutional adjudication, with the ex-
ception of public opinion expressed through positive law, in
order to form a constitutionally protected "tradition." Although
such formalistic interpretations might have satisfied
197. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
198. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 117
(1967).
199. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
200. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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post-Civil War generations who were enamored with scientific
metaphors, such interpretations are unlikely to persuade a
modern, relativistic America. Perhaps the post-World War II
Court should not have resolved as many issues as it did, keep-
ing them instead in the democratic domain. Supreme Court
nominations might be less theatrical if the Court were less
important, but such an institutional shift can only occur with
societal consensus. Since such a consensus seems unlikely to
develop, one can only hope that recent domestic conflicts like
abortion and racial relations prove to be less polarizing than
slavery.2 ° '
1. Informed public opinion: Determining "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment
In Casey,2  Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected a venerable constitutional tradition when they severed
constitutional law from public opinion. For over a hundred
years, state and federal courts have explicitly used public opin-
ion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment."
In. 1866, the Supreme Court stated, "What punishments shall
be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of
public opinion from one age to another." °3 In 1892, the South
Dakota Supreme Court applied severity and proportionality
standards, proscribing "very extreme cases, where the punish-
ment proposed is so severe and out of proportion to the offense
as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of rea-
sonable people. ' "° The South Dakota Supreme Court con-
sidered two forms of public opinion: the general "public senti-
ment" and the 'Judgment of reasonable people,"0 5 similar to
Hudson's consultation of "public opinion" and "legal men."
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down
201. Tocqueville observed that Americans tend to turn all political questions
into legal questions. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 290.
202. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
203. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1886) (holding that crime
punishable by imprisonment is "infamous crime" under Fifth Amendment); see also
Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) ("In Great Britain, as in other coun-
tries, public sentiment revolted against this severity, and . . . the additional pun-
ishment of solitary confinement was repealed.").
204. State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892), quoted in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2696 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence for
conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine).
205. Becker, 51 N.W. at 1022. Compare this with the approach taken in Unit-
ed States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
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bizarre punishments such as being forced to wear chains while
in prison for twelve years and being put under permanent
surveillance for making a false entry. The Weems Court echoed
Hudson's dual conception of public opinion: "The [cruel and un-
usual punishment] clause of the Constitution in the opinion of
the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.""6 The
Weems decision defined the appropriate form of public opinion
as a benign interaction between humane, learned commenta-
tors and the general public, a synthesis of the elite and the
masses, of Federalism and Republicanism.
Weems quoted Judge Cooley as one of its learned commen-
tators. Cooley had written that states could not "establish the
whipping post and the pillory in those States where they were
never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in those
States whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had
banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual punish-
ments."2 As the Weems Court noted, Cooley's analysis was
not very clear.208 In the second part of the quote, Cooley only
considered public opinion at the time of constitutional ratifica-
tion. He argued the state constitution had to be revised after
public opinion changed to justify a particular constitutional
limitation. Yet, Cooley also applied a more universal ap-
proach--certain punishments could never be introduced if they
had not been previously used. In other words, a few states
could continue to use the pillory if it had been their practice or
could reintroduce the pillory if public opinion had approved of
the practice at the time of Constitutional ratification, but the
rest of the states could never use the pillory. Although pro-
foundly different in details, Cooley's conception of public opin-
ion foreshadowed, at least in terms of complexity, Justice
Souter's theory of public opinion.
The Eighth Amendment did not play a major role again in
constitutional adjudication until after the Second World War.
When the Court finally returned to the Clause, not only did it
embrace the concept of public opinion, but it also flirted with
notoriously fickle and unreliable public opinion polls.20 9 For
206. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
207. Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 694 (8th ed. 1927)).
208. Id. at 375.
209. In 1968 the Court noted, "It appears that, in 1966, approximately 42% of
10371 1085
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some Justices, the Eighth Amendment became very dynamic,
requiring "a flexible analysis that recognized that as public
opinion changed, the validity of the penalty would have to be
re-examined."2 0
Even some of the conservatives who would have upheld the
death penalty for murder in Furman v. Georgia acknowledged
the constitutional significance of polls. Justice Powell wrote:
"Public opinion polls, while of little probative relevance, corrob-
orate substantially the conclusion derived from examining leg-
islative activity and jury sentencing-opinion on capital pun-
ishment is 'fairly divided.' , 11 Justice Powell had little diffi-
culty ascertaining the public mood, at least with regards to the
more visible murder cases: "It could hardly be suggested that
* in any of these highly publicized murder cases.., the public
has exhibited any signs of 'revulsion' at the thought of execut-
ing the convicted murderers. The public outcry, as we all know,
has been quite to the contrary."2' In other words, the conser-
vatives developed their own data base-jury sentencing, stat-
utes, and "public outcry"--to determine what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishments.21 From both perspectives, then,
public opinion was an appropriate factor.
the American public favored capital punishment for convicted murderers, while 47%
opposed it and 11% were undecided." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520
n.16 (1968) (citing 2 POLLS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW ON PUBLIC OPINION, No. 3, at
84 (1967)). Justice Stewart acknowledged a Gallup poll in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 181 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion).
For a general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of public opinion
polls, see Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Sugges-
tions for Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Standards Governing Weight and
Admissibility, 70 OR. L. REV. 463 (1991).
210. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 n.37 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). The Woodson plurality citei a House Report "noting that the modification of
the federal capital statutes to make the death penalty discretionary was in harmo-
ny with 'a growing public sentiment.'" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
293 n.27 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing H.R. REP. No. 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1896) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 545, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1894))) (finding man-
datory death penalty unconstitutional).
211. 408 U.S. at 441 n.36 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
212. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
213. The legislative branches also have a duty to interpret the Constitution.
For example, Congress will initially determine which crimes are "infamous": he
cases arising under the first Clause of the Fifth Amendment recognize that what
may be considered an 'infamous -rime' within the meaning of that Clause may be
affected by changes of public opinion from one age to another." Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 451 n.5 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (requiring testimony
before grand jury).
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In the past twenty years, some Justices questioned the
constitutionalization of public opinion polls. In his concurrence
in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Thurgood Marshall found polls of
limited value: "While a public opinion poll obviously is of some
assistance in indicating public acceptance or rejection of a spe-
cific penalty, its utility cannot be very great."214 Despite what
he said above, Justice Powell's dissent in Furman also chas-
tised the majority for relying too heavily on public opinion:
"[H]owever one may assess the amorphous ebb and flow of
public opinion generally on this volatile issue, this type of in-
quiry lies at the periphery-not the core-of the judicial pro-
cess in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion
is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function."21 In sub-
sequent years, public opinion polls played an increasingly un-
important role.216
More importantly, recent liberal and conservative Justices
have found any conception of public opinion to be constitution-
ally insignificant. Justice Marshall argued in Furman: "Regard-
less of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of
these punishments in a particular case or at any one moment
in history, the Constitution prohibits it."21" Not surprisingly,
214. 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting).
216. The judicial battle against the use of public opinion, and public opinion
polls in particular, began quickly. Chief Justice Burger was disturbed by the
majority's search for public opinion in various statutes, polls, and jury decisions to
determine if a state could execute a rapist: "If the Court is to rely on some 'public
opinion' process, does this not suggest the beginning of a 'trend?" Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (striking down death penal-
ty for rape). In Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice O'Connor was unimpressed by "several
public opinion surveys that indicate strong public opposition to execution of the
retarded." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (upholding execution of
mentally retarded murderer).
A law review article which challenged the validity and accuracy of public opin-
ion polls, Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1245 (1974), was cited in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 298 n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
352 n.5 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (holding that mandatory death penalty vio-
lates Eighth Amendment).
217. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). In
Furman, Justice Marshall also argued that informed public opinion would agree
with him that the death penalty was unconstitutional, particularly after the public
learned that the death penalty did not deter. Id. at 361-63 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Although it is easy to characterize Justice Marshall's informed opinion as
opinion that agrees with him, it is important to distinguish between public opinion
that has thought about an issue in contrast to immediate public reactions. See
Gregory A. Mark & Christopher L. Eisgruber, Introduction: Law and Political Cul-
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Justice Scalia dismissed "public opinion polls, the views of
interest groups, and the positions ... [of] professional associa-
tions" as too uncertain a foundation for constitutional law.21s
2. The mixed role of public opinion in determining procedural
fairness for criminal trials
The Supreme Court has expressed some of its strongest
views about public opinion in criminal cases, which often in-
volve high stakes and provoke powerful public reactions. Public
fury is often completely understandable, e.g.: "[L]ittle Marsha
Brill was dragged from her bicycle on one of the public thor-
oughfares... and there stabbed to death. The impact of...
two similar crimes upon the public mind was terrific .... Not
only were they outraged but they were terrified."219
The Court has periodically characterized the public as a
dangerous mob swayed by "public passion." Justices did not
always hide their contempt for fellow citizens. In 1851, in the
context of a scandal over an adulterous woman who went
abroad to have her baby and then accused her husband of a
crime, the Court observed: "The early times, and the unintelli-
gent condition of much of the population of New Orleans at
that day, must account for this absurd public opinion, and the
proceedings founded on it."22" The Supreme Court reversed
the Scottsboro boys' conviction, requiring counsel in all capital
cases, because of "hostile and excited public sentiment" and an
ture, 55 U. CII. L. REV. 413, 426 (1988) (discussing reflective public opinion).
218. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (up-
holding death penalty for seventeen-year-old juvenile). Although contemporary con-
servative Justices claimed to distance themselves from public opinion, not everyone
was convinced, even on the Court. Justice Stevens complained that "the 'hydraulic
pressure' of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and that properly
inifluences the deliberations of democratic legislatures-has played a role not only
in the Courts decision to hear this case . . . but even in its resolution of the con-
stitutional issue involved." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (permitting prosecutor to discuss effects of murder on fami-
ly members) (footnotes omitted). Stevens also accused Justice Scalia of applying the
views of the " 'victims' rights' movement." Id.
219. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 912 (1950) (Frankfurt-
er, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari to review state court order finding radio
broadcasters in contempt).
220. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 527 (1851) (discussing controversy
surrounding adulterous wife who had baby abroad and then misled innocent hus-
band); see also Ex parte Wall, :107 U.S. 265, 287 (1882) (approving striking attor-
ney from roll for encouraging mob to lynch suspect); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S.
22, 23 (1889) (basing decision not to review change of venue upon court's assess-
ment of state of public opinion).
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1088 1993
1037] THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1089
atmosphere of public passion.22' For instance, the defense
counsel was threatened and the trial court feared mob vio-
lence.2" Later, the Court took judicial notice of the Red Scare
in determining what amount is excessive bail under the Eighth
Amendment: "But the protest charges, and the defect in the
proceedings below appears to be, that, provoked by the flight of
certain Communists after conviction, the Government demands
and public opinion supports a use of the bail power to keep
Communist defendants in jail before conviction."2 '
Over the years, the Court has created a set of rules to
resolve such cases:2" "[A] trial judge must often be the bul-
wark of the legal system when presented with unpopular caus-
es and adverse public opinion."2" Juries were instructed to
ignore public opinion: 'WNhen you do this you have responded to
the high responsibilities which rest upon you as jurors. It mat-
ters not whether your verdict accords with public sentiment or
not."
226
221. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51, 58 (1932) (requiring paid counsel for
all indigents in death penalty cases).
222. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 223-25
(1979).
223. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 10 (1951) (opinion of Jackson, J.) (requiring
proper methods for setting bail for defendants indicted under Smith Act).
224. Trial judges must determine if local public opinion was so enraged that a
defendant could not receive a fair trial: "[T]he refusal to grant a change of venue
on the mere affidavit of the defendants' agent to the state of public opinion in the
county clearly involves matter of fact and discretion, and is not a ruling upon a
mere question of law." Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1889); see also Unit-
ed States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386, 431 (1909) (Peckham, J., dissenting) ("The men
who testified that there was no apprehension of mob violence were men who were
specially cognizant of the state of public opinion at that time.").
225. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645 n.22 (1980) (quoting Jacobs v. State,
361 So. 2d 640, 650-57 (Ala. 1978) (Jones, J., dissenting)) (not permitting death
penalty when jury was precluded from considering lesser included offense). Justice
Jackson wrote: "The judge was put in a position in which he either must appear
to yield his judgment to public clamor or to defy public sentiment." Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 395 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (upholding contempt for
unfairly publishing events in case pending before a state judge); see also Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 336 (1915) (holding that lower courts adequately considered
defendant's due process claim that trial was unfairly influenced by mob).
226. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489 n.18 (1978) (quoting trial court
instructions). The Supreme Court has periodically wrestled with the relationship
between juries and public opinion. The Court upheld the following jury instruction:
'[Iln this part of the trial the law does not forbid you from being influenced by
pity for the defendants and you may be governed by mere sentiment and sympathy
for the defendants in arriving at a proper penalty in this case; however, the law
does forbid you from being governed by mere conjecture, prejudice, public opinion
or public feeling." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 189 (1971) (holding that
jury cannot impose death penalty without having been given standards); accord
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In addition to keeping the adjudications immune from
undue influence by public opinion, the Supreme Court consid-
ered how public opinion directly affects the choice of appropri-
ate criminal and civil procedures. Justices have used public
opinion to justify administrative searches,22 ' the enlargement
of "admiralty forms and jurisdiction,"2 ' the scope of the right
to jury under the Seventh Amendment," the right to a pub-
lic hearing before extradition,"' the limited scope of the
state's defense of sovereign immunity,23 ' the liability of cities
for damages caused by riot," 2 and the absence of televisions
in the courtroom.2" In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court held
that a defendant could not use peremptory strikes to eliminate
all members of a particular race, noting "two trials in Miami,
Fla., in which all African-American jurors were peremptorily
struck by white defendants accused of racial beating, and the
public outrage and riots that followed the defendants' acquit-
tal. 2 4
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987) (upholding similar jury instruction).
Judicial notice of public ignorance helped determine proper jury instructions:
"The importance of a no-inference instruction is underscored by a recent national
public opinion survey conducted for the National Center for State Courts, revealing
that 37% of those interviewed believed that it is the responsibility of the accused
to prove his innocence." Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 n.21 (1981) (holding
that defendant had right to jury instruction explaining significance of defendant's
refusing to testify); see also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 n.12 (1971)
(quoting Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 94 N.E. 369, 376-77 (Mass.
1911)) (holding that statute preventing change of venue, despite prejudice, on sole
ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, violates 14th Amendment); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965) (excessive publicity prejudicial to defendant). The
Supreme Court has also acknowledged that juries bring a form of public opinion
into the courtroom, ensuring that the defendant is found in violation of community
mores as well as the law. Thus defense counsel could conduct a broad voir dire.
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 914 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurt-
er, J.) (denying certiorari).
227. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959) (upholding health inspection
of house without search warrant).
228. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 493 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dis-
senting) (admiralty case involving collision between two steamboats).
229. Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 486 (1858) (holding that plaintiff
in ejectment must always prove personal legal title).
230. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112 (1852) (holding that magistrate
must participate in extradition proceeding).
231. Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1925) (establishing priorities under
bankruptcy law), quoted in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
359 (1955) (reversing dismissal of counterclaim by bank against Republic of China).
232. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911) (state can make
county liable for mob damage).
233. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
234. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (criminal defendant cannot use peremptory
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Even in criminal trials, public opinion has a benign side:
"The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contem-
poraneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power .... Without
publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
publicity, all other checks are of small account."2 "5 Although
trials must be conducted in public,236 pretrial litigation can
take place behind closed doors., "Publicity concerning the pro-
ceedings at a pretrial hearing, however, could influence public
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of
inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual tri-
al."237 An examination of the Court's references to public
opinion in criminal cases reveals that the Court has had sev-
eral different publics in mind. The public can be dangerous,
ignorant, a source of guidance, or a benign check on judicial
abuse.
3. Public opinion as ward of the Court: The First Amendment
Progressive public opinion served as a consultant in most
Eighth Amendment cases, while public passion was viewed as a
threat in many criminal cases. In the First Amendment con-
text, public opinion played a different role, as a ward of the
Court. The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the First
Amendment to protect "public opinion" from inappropriate
governmental regulation. As early as 1855, dissenting Justice
Daniel equated the suppression of public opinion with tyranny,
"a power absolute and irresponsible enough to repress oppo-
sition, or to silence the expression of public sentiment. " "2m In
1889, the Court explained the importance of public debate:
challenges to exclude on the basis of race) (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Su-
preme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 195-96 (1989)). The entire Rodney King
affair offers a compelling example of how public opinion interacts with the judicial
system.
235. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948) (reversing contempt based upon
secret proceedings), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
592 (1980) (Brennen, J., concurring in judgment) (protecting newspapers' right to
be present during criminal trial proceedings); see Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct.
2720 (1991) (protecting defense attorney statements at press conference concerning
pending adjudication).
236. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
237. Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).
238. The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dis-
senting) (federal court has jurisdiction over maritime accident).
1037] 1091
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.Public opinion thus enlightened [by debate], brought to bear
upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent
abuses."" 9 To facilitate such informed debate, the Court had
to protect the media from inappropriate governmental interfer-
ence.24 ° Justice Brandeis considered public opinion to be "the
life of the nation." 1
239. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (upholding federal
law preventing Chinese worker from returning to United States). In several dis-
sents, Justice Black elaborated on the Court's duty to defend unpopular political
opinions. He took judicial notice of the excesses of the Red Scare. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding convictions of
Communist leaders under Smith Act). Justice Black analogized the Subversive
Activities Review Board's registration requirements to William Pitt's attempt to
protect the "public mind" from perverted factions by requiring all writers to sign
their works. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 153 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding Board's finding that
American Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization").
240. The Court has been ambivalent about the media. On the one hand, gov-
ernmental suppression of the media indicates tyranny: "The tragic history of recent
years demonstrates far too well how despotic governments may interfere with the
press and other means of communication in their efforts to corrupt public opinion
and to destroy individual freedom." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
51-52 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (upholding governmental antitrust action
against news media). Consequently, the Court must protect the media: "A free
press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.&" Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
620 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding ban on political solicitations of co-
workers under state merit system); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05
(1940) (striking down state law outlawing loitering and picketing near a business).
On the other hand, the Court has also expressed fears over the media's capaci-
ty to manipulate popular opinion. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202
(1957). It has acknowledged how a few private individuals have accumulated vast
power. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1974) (nev-
ertheless invalidating statute forzing newspaper to print replies to editorials). That
power is largely unaccountable because the media is not forced to disclose informa-
tion, while the government "may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what they
might prefer to conceal." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.) (denying media right of access to jail). Such concerns helped legiti-
mate the affirmative action plan in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
565-71 n.16 (1990) (quoting Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1252 (1949)) (upholding federal affirmative action plan to achieve broadcast diversi-
ty). The Court's media anxieties explained why it was initially unwilling to let
television into the courtroom. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965).
Perhaps the most pathetic example of the Court's use of public opinion oc-
curred in 1915, when it concluded that movies should not receive First Amendment
protection because films were only entertainment and could not affect public opin-
ion. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915). Wheth-
er one considers that case a "watershed" case or not, it was overruled almost forty
years later. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
241. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 340 n.1 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. B.
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To justify its doctrine favoring free speech, the Court has
frequently cited leading lawyers such as John Adams242 or
Lord Erskine, who defended Thomas Paine in a libel action
over Common Sense." 3 The Court has cited Thomas Jeffer-
son, who had a broad conception of free speech (except when he
was President):' "IT]he opinions of men are not the object of
civil government, nor under its jurisdiction." 5 The Court has
also quoted Justice Story:
So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as a
check or an incentive among the representatives of a free peo-
ple, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes,
published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy pub-
lic favor and be demanded by public opinion.246
The Court twice used the following quotation from Judge Coo-
ley:
[The First Amendment includes the need] to protect parties in
the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure
their right to a free discussion of public events and public
measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the
government and any person in authority to the bar of public
opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exer-
ASSN 308 (n.d.)) (upholding conviction under state law for teaching or advocating
resistance to war effort). Justice Jackson believed that protecting public opinion
was the goal of the First Amendment: "The very purpose of the First Amendment
is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind."
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (voiding state
law requiring labor organizers to register before soliciting members).
242. "W[James] Otis' protest [that Writs of Assistance should require a showing
of probable cause] was eloquent; but he lost the case. His speech, however, rallied
public opinion. Then and there,' wrote John Adams, 'the child Independence was
born. " Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 248 (1856)) (permitting search based upon
reliable informant).
243. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 n.4 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48 (1936) (quoting 1
SPEECHES OF LORD ERSKINE 524-25 (James C. High ed., 1876)); see also LLOYD P.
STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE 210-16 (1947) (relating the trial of Thomas Paine).
244. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE
DARKER SIDE (1963) (examining Jefferson's beliefs and actions throughout his years
in public office). "
245. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE
JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA app. 976 (John P. Fowler ed., 1967), quoted in Schnei-
der v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (proscribing presidential security screening
program of merchant mariners).
246. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (quoting 1 STORY, CONSTITUTION
§ 841) (upholding delegation of import duty powers to President).
1037] 1093
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1093 1993
1094 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
cise of the authority which the people have conferred upon
them.
247
There should be little surprise that the Court has frequent-
ly cited famous thinkers, politicians, and treatise writers in
constitutional adjudication. The Federalist Papers is the most
prominent example. 2  Every modern Justice has considered
such authorities. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who asserted
in Casey that the Court should not listen to any form of public
opinion, cited John Locke as an authority in a constitutional
opinion. 9 Justice Scalia cited with approval an article by
Professor Epstein in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.25 ° Such citations provide additional authority allow-
ing the Justices to consult "informed public opinion," to interact
with the legal scholars who struggle with difficult jurispruden-
tial problems. The real debate is not over consulting public
opinion, it is over whose public opinions should be considered.
The Court's duty to protect politically unpopular opin-
ions25 1 puts the Court in a difficult balancing act. Both major-
247. 2 THOMAS L. COOLLY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (Walter
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927), quoted in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962)
(reversing judicial contempt).
248. Wilson, supra note 80.
249. Justice Rehnquist favorably referred to John Locke in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (striking down OSHA regulation concerning
exposure to benzene).
250. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing Richard Epstein, Takings: Descent
and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1).
251. At some point, however, political dissent becomes constitutionally unpro-
tected violence: "It seems to me most important that the courts should distinguish
between the two with particular care in these days, when officials under the pres-
sure of.events and public opinion are tempted to blur the distinction." Norton v.
Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 399 U.S. 906, 909 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (allowing no remedy for students suspended for
distributing leaflets criticizing university administration). The distinction is not
easy to find.
Judge Learned Hand claimed to protect "public opinion" but excluded the coun-
selling of legal disobedience:
One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and
those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by
any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is
the final source of government in a democratic state.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
In Thornhill v. Alabama, Justice Murphy made access to the "market of public
opinion" the constitutional lodestone that separates permissible from unprotected
political speech: "Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1094 1993
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1095
ities and minorities have the right to express themselves: "Be-
cause a subject is legally arguable, however, does not mean
that public sentiment will be patient of its advocacy at all
times and in all manners."252 To protect minorities from ma-
jority abuses of their free speech rights, the Court must deter-
mine the climate of opinion at the time2 of a particular con-
stitutional controversy: "People were threatened in NA.A.C.P.
and Bates. But while an angry public opinion, and the evils
which it may spawn, are relevant considerations in adjudging,
in light of the totality of relevant considerations,.., the exis-
tence of an ugly public temper does not, as such and without
more, incapacitate government."2'
When it makes such factual determinations, the Court
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no
opportunity to test the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance in the
market of public opinion." 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940). In other words, certain cate-
gories of speech are unprotected because they short-circuit public discourse, pre-
venting public opinion from having the last word. First Amendment doctrine
therefore incorporates public opinion both as an end and as a doctrinal litmus test.
252. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 33 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(statute prohibiting any breach of peace could not be applied with the First
Amendment to person making controversial speech).
253. The Court has defended particularly virulent speech during elections.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down various limits
on campaign spending). As early as 1852, a dissenting Justice tried to
constitutionalize the public's earlier rejection of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 514 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(voiding state tax upon alien passengers). Consequently, political campaigns can be
very ugly affairs, constrained only by public opinion.
Justice Scalia let his disgust overwhelm his judgment when he stated:
I doubt that those who framed and adopted the First Amendment would
agree that avoiding the New Corruption, that is, calibrating political
speech to the degree of public opinion that supports it, is even a desirable
objective, much less one that is important enough to qualify as a compel-
ling state interest. Those Founders designed, of course, a system in which
popular ideas would ultimately prevail.
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (majority upheld state law prohibiting corporations from using gener-
al treasury funds in election); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261
n.16 (1952) (quoting David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group
Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 728 (1942)) (upholding statute outlawing group defa-
mation). It is easy to become appalled by politicians, political campaigns, the me-
dia, the electorate, the average citizen, even democracy itself. The American experi-
ment may fail, but it would more likely collapse should a petulant Court withdraw
constitutional protection from basic democratic processes, tawdry though they some-
times are. The Court must accept the glitter and manipulation as existing costs
and characteristics of American democratization.
254. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 102 (1961) (emphasis added).
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should not be very deferential to the elected branches255 nor
to the juries who decide "constitutional facts" that can under-
mine free speech rights. The Court was correct in closely scruti-
nizing a jury decision that civil rights leader Medgar Evers
caused recompensable damage for leading an economic boycott
during the Civil Rights movement.256 The subtle relationship
between law and public opinion permeates this area of consti-
tutional law. The Court's determinations of which "facts" a jury
must decide and what "standards" a jury must apply, such as
"clear and present danger" for seditious speech, "malice" for
libel against a public figure, or "prevailing community stan-
dards" for obscenity,"' invariably reflect the Court's underly-
ing view of how and how much local public opinion should con-
strain various categories of speech.258
255. [W]e are cautioned that state legislatures must be left free to
'experiment' and to make 'legislative' judgments. We are told that
mistakes may be made during the legislative process of curbing public
opinion. In such event the Court fortunately does not leave those
mistakenly curbed, or any of us for that matter, unadvised.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting).
256. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932-34 (1982).
257. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (opinion of Harlan,
J.) (post office could not ban magazines which were not obscene). Dissenting in an
obscenity case, Justice Douglas complained that the unelected judiciary should not
set strict obscenity standards because that would bend "the popular mind to new
norms of conformity." United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Congress may ban obscene material
under Commerce Clause).
258. No history of public opinion in constitutional interpretation would be
complete without noting the Court's tendency to provide less protection to political
dissent during wartime, when the majority popular opinion is often the most cohe-
sive and self-righteous. Only one of the World War I speech cases overtly discussed
public opinion, but they all reflected it. According to the dissent in Schaefer, the
First Amendment does not protect "willfully untrue statements or reports of mili-
tary operations which might mislead public opinion as to the competency of the
army or navy or its leaders." Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 492-93
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (evidence sufficient to convict several defendants
under Espionage Act). The Schaefer Court actually created a "malice" standard of
"willfully untrue statements" that is not all that different from the acclaimed mal-
ice standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (striking down
jury verdict for libel against public figures for lack of malice). Consequently, the
real problem with many cases is neither the principles nor the doctrines, it is the
application of those principles and doctrines.
On the other hand, the general goal of encouraging debate so public opinion
can be better informed has led to Justices' arguing for a generous reading of the
Speech and Debate Clause. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (hold-
ing that Speech and Debate Clause immunity extends to Senator's aide). The Court
has to battle governmental secrecy: "By using devices of secrecy, the government
attains the power to 'manage' the news and through it to manipulate public
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4. Public opinion triumphant: Economic and social legislation
a. The Lochner era. After the Civil War, the Court creat-
ed a more formalistic, pseudo-scientific jurisprudence, which
was gradually undermined by internal contradictions, Legal
Realism, and the Depression.259 The Lochner era attempted
to create objective, principled doctrinal limits that would per-
mit the Justices to distinguish between unconstitutional inter-
ferences and legitimate exercises of the police power, as well as
between law and policy. The quest was futile because doctrine
will always have an element of incoherence due to irreconcil-
able political goals and beliefs. The legal system, particularly in
its leading cases, invariably reflects society's most pressing ten-
sions. After all, the "felt necessities of the time" influence plain-
tiffs even more than courts. The nine Justices are torn between
competing interests and ideologies which have a claim to some
power and constitutional protection.
opinion." Id. at 640-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Secrecy in a Free Society,
213 NATION 254, 256 (1971)); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (up-
holding congressional delegation of power); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 603 (1889). Free speech within Congress was particularly important: 'The
actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the
power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons." Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 366 (1917) (Day, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 531 (1884)) (Congress has power to set eight-hour-day work limits but not
wages for interstate carriers).
Justices have noted the link between informed public opinion and free speech
while deciding to be wary of censorship, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43, 68-69 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (permitting city to require film be
presented to it prior to granting of permit); to require full dissemination of infor-
mation about labor disputes, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (strik-
ing down statute prohibiting picketing near businesses); to disclose allegedly im-
proper business practices, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 305 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); to guar-
antee free speech rights of civil servants, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952) (proscribing loyalty oath for civil servants); and to insure the separation of
church and state, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2674-75 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (public school could not have nonsectarian prayer at graduation ceremo-
ny). In a similar vein, an attorney told the Court in 1866: "[W]henever the people
are told, as they have been in this case, that the indefeasible right to worship God
according to the dictates of conscience is about to be invaded, the public mind at
once arouses itself to repel the invasion." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277, 304 (1866) (argument of State counsel) (prohibiting State from requiring cler-
ics and priests to take oath that they never assisted Confederacy).
259. Professor Horwitz has described how American law evolved from a
Blackstonian, quasi-feudalism to an explicitly developmental system and next to a
"formalist" approach. HORWlTZ, TRANSFORMATION 1780-1860, supra note 162, at 166.
Horwitz's second book describes how formalism collapsed under legal realism's
assault. HoRwriz, TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44.
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In his famous dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes reminded
the nation of the Court's limits. The Lochner majority did not
only err because they constitutionalized their own economic
ideology. They also ignored the public's views: "I think that the
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when
i is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opin-
ion .... ,260 Such relativism undercuts both the Casey joint
opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent. On a doctrinal level, Jus-
tice Holmes advised against an expansive judicial reading of
substantive due process. But more generally, he was wary of
any rigid theory, such as Justice Scalia's originalism, which can
isolate the Court from the polity. The rest of that same sen-
tence in his Lochner dissent demonstrates that Holmes' skepti-
cism still mandated limited judicial review: "[Whenever] it can
be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental princi-
ples as they have been understood by the traditions of our peo-
ple and our law." 1 Even this scope of judicial review is con-
textual; the Court must protect American traditions and Ameri-
can law, not jurisprudential abstractions.
Another problem with Lochner-style substantive due pro-
cess was the Court's inconsistency. The Supreme Court has
continually fluctuated between perceiving the public and public
opinion as perverse, wise, and sovereign, even during the
pro-capital eras of vested rights and Lochner formalism. Some-
times the post-Civil War Court denigrated the general
populace's wisdom, noting, for example, "the well-known mania
of the people to run in debt for public improvements."262
Thus, private corporations had to be protected from public
venality to avoid "the monstrous injustice of thus placing the
large investments of complainant, made under the stimulus of
the inducement held out by the act of 1858, at the absolute
260. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
firther discussion of this passage from Lochner, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Su-
preme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 79-82 (1993).
Holmes' common law tradition remains a more formidable obstacle, with a
lengthy historical pedigree, to Justice Scalia's "originalism" than the "non-
interpretivism" that Justice Scalia has castigated. Scalia has explicitly rejected the
common law perspective. Antonin Scalia, Essay: The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
261. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
262. Ritchie v. Franklin County, 89 U.S. 67, 75 (1874) (state can collect special
tax to pay interest on bonds).
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mercy of an irresponsible public sentiment, or of public cupidi-
ty."2" Indeed, the people would not have ratified the Consti-
tution if there was "the possibility of a government usurping
the ordinary business of individuals, driving them out of the
market."2" The Constitution limited state power in the mar-
ketplace: "It is not to be supposed that the company would
have entered upon this large undertaking in view of the possi-
bility that, in one of the sudden changes of public opinion to
which all municipalities are more or less subject, the city might
resolve to enter the field itself."'265
Nevertheless, that same formalistic Court often deferred to
the public. In 1876, the Court applied the malleable law-policy
distinction to uphold the purchase of stock by local communi-
ties to construct a toll road: "Whether the policy was a wise one
or not is not now the question. It was in accordance with the
public sentiment of that period."266 Through the legislature,
the public could determine the means of economic development:
"[T]he legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, [can] decide
that this general benefit is better promoted by [railroads'] con-
struction through individuals or corporations than by the State
itself."2 7 Because corporations were state creatures, the gov-
ernment could limit their powers and regulate their abuses.
Legislatures could define and proscribe monopolies based upon
public sentiment:268 "[T]he general sentiment of the public de-
clares that such monopolies must be limited to the necessities
of the case, and rebels against the attempt of one road to con-
trol all traffic between terminal points."69 Public opinion, op-
263. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 367 (1884) (Field,
J., dissenting) (quoting a United States district court case from California) (states
can require utilities to supply goods at fixed prices).
264. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 457 (1905) (state agents
liable for federal liquor tax).
265. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1898)
(holding city can not erect water works in violation of contractual noncompetition
clause).
266. County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682, 693 (1876) (holding county
can issue bonds).
267. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 658 (1890) (quoting
1 COOLEY, supra note 247, at 537) (holding that Congress has power to grant rail-
road right of way through Indian Territory).
268. "It is certainly the conception of a large body of public opinion that the
control of prices through combinations tends to restraint of trade and to monopoly,
and is evil." National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905) (holding
state antitrust laws do not violate due process).
269. Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 676-77 (1896) (state can amend
10371 1099
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erating through the legislature, could be the basis for amend-
ing corporate charters: "[H]ence it has been held that charters
for purposes inconsistent with a due regard for the public
health or public morals may be abrogated in the interests of a
more enlightened public opinion.2 70 The states could also use
their police power to regulate some markets, or in the case of
lotteries and intoxicating liquors, 271 even ban the sale of pre-
viously legal goods. 2 Most importantly, the Court ignored
Taney's interpretive technique in Dred Scott, upholding paper
money even though the "public mind" at the time of constitu-
corporate charter if right to amend in original incorporation). "The acts of the
Minnesota legislature of 1874 and 1881 undoubtedly reflected the general sentiment
of the public, that their best security is in competition." Id. at 677.
270. Id at 666. The states first had to put a savings clause in the charter to
allow future legislative amendments. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
271. For some years after the Civil War, leading dissenters to the Lochner
jurisprudence made explicit references to public opinion. The first Justice Harlan
asserted in Pollock that public opinion, not the Court, should determine income tax
rates:
But the remedy for such abuses is to be found at the ballot-box, and in a
wholesome public opinion which the representatives of the people will not
long, if at all, disregard, and not in the disregard by the judiciary of
powers that have been committed to another branch of the government.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 680 (1895) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (finding federal income tax to be unconstitutional direct tax).
Justice Holmes held public opinion in little regard: "I loathe the thick-fingered
clowns we call the people." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes (Nov. 16, 1862), in
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR Lrr'rERS AND DIARY 71 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1946),
quoted in HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at 123. Neverthe-
less, he concluded the public could abuse many constitutional powers without legal
recourse:
The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compen-
sation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it
has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it .... Wine has been
thought good for man from the time of the Apostles until recent years.
But when public opinion changed it did not need the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, notwithstanding the Fourteenth, to enable a State to say that the
business should end.
Tyson & Bro. v. Banten, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
state can enforce criminal prohibition against reselling tickets at higher prices). A
lawyer appearing before the Supreme Court anticipated Holmes in 1847: "But there
was no occasion to multiply proofs of public opinion, for intemperance was every-
where deprecated and lamented, and had almost everywhere fallen under the con-
demnation of legal restraint, by enactments for that purpose, or by taxation."
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 520-21 (1847) (argument of State
counsel).
272. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 (1898) (refusing to grant habeas cor-
pus petition to individual charged with violating maximum hour limitations for
miners).
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tional ratification opposed such inflationary, pro-debtor
means.
273
Lawyers quickly seized upon such internal contradictions.
Overtly influenced by Brandeis' famous brief, the Supreme
Court in Muller v. Oregon created a loophole to reconcile the
tension between perpetually changing public opinion and a
fixed, written Constitution:
The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may
not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little
or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us
for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread
belief that woman's physical structure... justify special
legislati[ve] restrict[ions] .... Constitutional questions, it is
true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public
opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution
that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative
action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular
government which otherwise would be lacking."4
The Muller Court attempted to reconcile the fixed text with
fluid public opinion by asserting that public opinion does not
"settle" constitutional cases. Public opinion, however, could
influence constitutional determinations. The Muller Court tech-
nically decided the case by labelling the shift in public opinion
a question of "fact":
At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and
debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional
limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact,
a widespread and long continued belief concerning it is wor-
thy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all mat-
ters of general knowledge.7 5
Justices frequently employed the fact-law distinction to shift
away from existing doctrinal formalism, recharacterizing ques-
tions of law as questions of fact. Not surprisingly, Justice
Brandeis, author of the famed Muller brief, was a leader in the
273. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 654 (1870) (Field, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Mr. Ellsworth in 3 MADISON PAPERS 1345 (Henry D. Gilpin ed.,
1842)) (upholding congressional power to print paper money); see also Hepburn v.
Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 633 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) (invalidating
statute permitting paper money to satisfy debts).
274. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (emphasis added) (upholding
ten-hour day for women workers).
275. Id. at 420-21.
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use of this technique. Justice Brandeis wrote that both Con-
gress and the public legitimately could consider the "evidential
fact" of changes in the cost of living." In an earlier dissent,
Justice McKenna noted that public opinion had changed about
unions: 'We know things are in change-have changed-and a
mark of it is that the drift of public opinion, and of legislation
following opinion, is to alter the relation between employer and
employee."2 7 In short, the constitutionality of a statute de-
pended on five Justices' determination that a certain variable
had become a social, legislative "fact."278 Eventually, public
opinion, by itself, became a constitutionally relevant "fact" for
Brandeis:
Nearly all legislation involves a weighing of public needs as
against private desires; and likewise a weighing of relative
social values. Since government is not an exact science, pre-
vailing public opinion concerning the evils and the remedy is
among the important facts deserving consideration; particu-
larly, when the public conviction is both deep-seated and
widespread and has been reached after deliberation.27
These interpretations resemble Justice Souter's argument
in Casey that the Court should consider overruling watershed
cases when there is widespread belief that the facts have
changed. Once the Court permits public opinion to redetermine
such legislative/constitutional "facts" as women's vulnerability
in Muller or black schoolchildren's injuries in Brown, public
opinion will have the capacity to transform most constitutional
doctrines. The constitutional text remains the same, but its
meaning becomes fluid.28 °
276. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 496 (1929)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ICC can issue recaption order requiring railroads to place
excess income in a reserve fund and not to keep interest there).
277. Arizona Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 438 (1919) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting) (upholding state employers' liability law for inherently hazardous em-
ployments).
278. See HoRwITz, TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at 189, 198.
279. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (state cannot immunize union leaders from civil liabilities).
280. Although he lost the case, the Solicitor General advocating enforcement of
child labor laws combined public opinion with existing caselaw upholding state
police powers: "It cannot be denied that a change in public opinion regarding child
labor has occurred like that in relation to lottery tickets." Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 253 (1918) (argument of Solicitor General) (Congress cannot regulate
child labor).
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b. The death of economic substantive due pro-
cess. Although a judicial revolution occurred in 1937, the first
shift took place three years earlier. Taking judicial notice of the
Depression, the Court upheld a state law limiting creditors'
remedies against defaulting mortgage holders in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.281 The majority disregarded the
history of the impairment of Contract Clause, which indicated
the Framers had created the Clause to preclude exactly the
kind of legislation involved in Blaisdell.282 Dissenting Justice
Sutherland not only condemned the majority's dismissal of
history but also claimed the Court reinterpreted the Constitu-
tion because of a change in public opinion:
Public sentiment -and action effect such changes, and the
courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which should
allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to
a written constitution a construction not warranted by the
intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with
reckless disregard of official oath and public duty.2"
Justice Sutherland's fears were more than amply realized.
In 1936, Justice Cardozo quoted in a dissent Professor Warren,
who observed that numerous constitutional objections concern-
ing the Bankruptcy Clause, "so hotly and frequently asserted
from period to period, were overcome either by public opinion
or by the Court."28 In 1937, the Court began systematically
to overrule economic substantive due process cases. Chief Jus-
281. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
282. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
39-51 (1969). See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love
Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119.
283. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 452 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 COOLEY, supra note 247, at 124) (state can
establish mortgage relief during Depression). Justice Sutherland quoted Judge Coo-
ley extensively:
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would
be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circum-
stances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to
the varying moods of public opinion, and with a view to putting the fun-
damentals of government beyond their control, that these instruments are
framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in
their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law.
IdL
284. CHARLES WARREN, BANxRUPTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 10 (1935),
quoted in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S.
513, 536 n.6 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (state water district can issue bonds,
levy and collect taxes, sue and be sued).
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tics Burger later expressed the prevailing view: "The means
chosen to effectuate legitimate governmental interests are not
for this Court to select. 'These are matters for the legislative
judgment controlled by public opinion."'285 The last word on
this struggle belongs to retired Justice Roberts, the "switching"
Justice who "saved Nine": "Looking back, it is difficult to see
how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform
standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a
unified economy." "'
IV. WHAT ROLE OUGHT PUBLIC OPINION PLAY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION?
This section will argue that several conceptions of public
opinion ought to be part of constitutional adjudication. It will
start with a relatively non-controversial example: the Court's
continuing duty to eradicate state-sponsored racism, a particu-
larly odious form of public opinion. This section will then exam-
ine several "structural" issues to demonstrate how public opin-
ion, reflected through the legislative process, has and ought to
have the last word on many important constitutional questions.
The article will then return to the Casey controversy, evalu-
285. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)) (invalidating city's general ban of billboards carrying noncommercial
advertising).
286. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951). Seven
years earlier, Justice Roberts had been more committed to stare decisis:
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era
whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court,
which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a
steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary
ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh
doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our insti-
tutions.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 670 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (states cannot
abridge right to vote in federal elections on the basis of race).
The modem Court has conceded that public opinion, directly and indirectly via
legislation, is a major factor in regulating the economy. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141, 149 (1940) (legislature can refuse to extend antitrust laws to farmers and
stockmen). The Court has also deferred to congressional regulation of the
business-labor relationship. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (state can pass "right to
work" law); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 349-50 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (court has authority under federal law to issue national
labor injunction); see also ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRisis AND THE RULE
OF LAW xiii, xv, xvii, 25 (2d ed. 1976).
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ating the three relevant opinions in light of what has been
presented. That discussion leads in turn to an inquiry about
the relationship between "principles" and "public opinion."
A. Weeding Out Venal Public Opinion:
Equal Protection and Race
Nowhere has the Supreme Court's uneasy relationship
with reality been more evident than in its race cases. The bat-
tle against racism, after all, is an effort to eradicate a vile,
unenlightened form of public opinion."' Putting the issue
more generally, the Court cannot determine which traits de-
serve additional constitutional protection as "suspect classifica-
tions" without consulting history, particularly the history of
public "irrational prejudice."2 s For example, Justices Murphy
and Rutledge looked at California's "public mind" to argue that
the California Alien Land Law was racist and unconstitution-
al.
289
Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion demonstrates the
Court's selective use of public opinion. Taney inaccurately de-
scribed the state of public opinion at the time of the
Constitution's ratification and expressly ignored existing opin-
ion at the time of his decision." On the other hand, Taney
properly observed that colonial racial laws, such as the pro-
scription against racial intermarriage, were stigmatic proof of
the blacks' lack of equal citizenship rights.2
287. I do not mean to imply that the First Amendment leaves racist speech
completely unprotected. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (in-
validating statute criminalizing burning of cross under a viewpoint discriminatory
approach).
288. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 450 (1985)
(invalidating city's refusal to permit a group home for mentally retarded).
289. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-62 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(holding state cannot pass discriminatory alien land law).
290. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-09 (1856).
291. Id. at 409. The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott. The Su-
preme Court later reflected: "It is sufficient to say that the country did not acqui-
esce in the opinion, and that the civil war, which shortly thereafter followed, pro-
duced such changes in judicial, as well as public sentiment, as to seriously impair
the authority of this case" Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274 (1901) (Congress
and President can permit Puerto Rico to set different customs and duties than rest
of country).
Yet there were limits to that momentarily enlightened public sentiment. The
drafters initially did not include an explicit right to vote in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because they feared public opinion. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 180
n.42 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2532 (1866)).
10371 1105
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The Supreme Court firmly put its racial blinders on when
it upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v.
Ferguson.292 Ignoring Taney's argument in Dred Scott, the
majority did not find segregation to be stigmatic. They consid-
ered any injuries to be mere fantasies of the black minority. In
his dissent, Justice Harlan openly discussed the pernicious
influence of Southern racism on the laws and customs in ques-
tion:
[Earlier state judicial decisions] were made at a time when
public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by the insti-
tution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do
justice to the black man; and when, so far as the rights of
blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the
supreme law of the land."
In a variety of ways, Chief Justice Warren demonstrated
his political astuteness when desegregating public schools in
Brown v. Board of Education,2" overruling Plessy in the pro-
cess. He knew Brown had to satisfy world opinion: "The federal
government prepared an. amicus brief that explained in great
detail the harmful effects of American segregation on the for-
eign policy of the executive branch."2 95 He lobbied Justice
Reed for months to join the opinion to create a unanimous
vote. 96  Chief Justice Warren then wrote a short,
nonjudgmental opinion, designed to be accessible to the average
citizen. 97 He criticized neither the South nor the Plessy
Court, gently distinguishing Plessy by citing leading social
scientists who had recently "discovered" that segregation in-
jures black children. The Brown 11 remedy also reflected defer-
ence 298 to the Southern white public, both in terms of timing
292. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Chief Justice Shaw created the doctrine. LEVY, supra
note 171, at 109-17.
293. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
294. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
295. FISHER, supra note **, at 18. The Government's brief noted: "Racial dis-
crimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises
doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the dem-
ocratic faith." 49 LANDmARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THM UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Cas-
per eds., 1975).
296. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 698 (1975).
297. "The genius of the Warren opinion ... was that it was so simple and
unobtrusive." Id at 697 (quoting Barret Prettyman).
298. "[Ilt should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."
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("all deliberate speed") and implementation (by lower federal
courts).299 In short, a variety of public opinions, regional, na-
tional, and international, permeated those all-important deci-
sions.
After the South became intransigent, the Warren Court
turned more judgmental."e The Court found local school de-
segregation plans to be inadequate because they were compro-
mised by hostile public opinion."0 1 The Court knowingly.
forced its decrees upon an unwilling white majority: "[Tihe
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them.""0 2 Justice
Brennan described the South's dismal racial history:
The real evil in the southern States you will find in the baf-
fled pro-slavery tendency prevailing there; in a diseased pub-
lic sentiment which partly vents itself in violent acts, partly
winks at them, and partly permits itself to be overawed by
them. That public sentiment is not only terrorizing timid
people, but it is corrupting the jury-box, it is overawing the
witness-stand, and it is thus obstructing the functions of jus-
tice.0 3
More recently, the Court has returned to a more formal
conception of equality, levelling the playing field without evalu-
ating the condition of the players. The actual state of public
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (requiring desegregation of
schools with all deliberate speed) (Brown I).
299. KLUGER, supra note 296, at 698.
300. In 1968, the Court relied upon legislative history to outlaw racially dis-
criminatory housing- "[The Senator's concern .. . was that Negroes might be 'op-
pressed and in fact deprived of their freedom' not only by hostile laws but also by
'prevailing public sentiment." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432
n.54 (1968) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866)) (holding that
African-Americans have right to sue private home sellers for racial discrimination).
301. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (rejecting freedom of
choice plan as insufficient to accomplish elimination of dual school system). The
district court in Dowell v. Board of Education criticized desegregation plans: "[The
Board] rationalize[d] its intransigence on the constitutionally unsound basis that
public opinion [was] opposed to any further desegregation." 338 F. Supp. 1256,
1270 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041
(1972).
302. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968) (holding that "free
transfer plan" is insufficient to eliminate dual school system) (quoting Brown II,
349 U.S. at 300).
303. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 218-19 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
687 (1872) (remarks of Senator Schurz)) (emphasis added) (holding that white
plaintiff failed to prove conspiracy under civil rights law).
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opinion, particularly the overall extent and effects of racism,
has become constitutionally insignificant. Justice O'Connor
struck down Richmond's affirmative action plan in City of Rich-
mond v. JA. Croson Co. partially on the technical ground that
there were insufficient fiadings of racism in the local construc-
tion industry."' On one level, that legalistic argument bor-
ders on the absurd. There is and has been widespread, dam-
aging racism in Richmond, Virginia that has impaired black
entrepreneurs for centuries. Richmond, after all, was the capi-
tal of the Confederacy. There may be reasons not to have affir-
mative action, but insufficient evidence of racism and racism's
insidious effects is not one of them.
In his Casey dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist used Brown
to demonstrate how his jurisprudence was grounded on ab-
straction, not racial realities: "The rule of Brown is not tied to
popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment
that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segre-
gation, no matter whether the public might come to believe
that it is beneficial."0 5 Somewhat ironically, Chief Justice
Rlhnquist was confirming an earlier liberal complaint that the
Brown opinion was too contextual because it is largely pre-
mised upon unstable social science findings of injury. There are
times to be formalisticas and to ignore public opinion, but
there are other times to take such realities into consideration.
Many liberals will use formal doctrine to immunize Brown's
core holding proscribing legal segregation from changes in
social views or social science, yet they also want the Court to
be aware of the actual state of racial relations in affirmative
action cases.30 7 The judicial choice is over when to use the
public opinion argument, expressly or not, not whether to use it
at, all.
B. Public Opinion as Constitutional Decisionmaker
and the Constitutional Structure
In a recent article, this author wrote that the American
304. 488 U.S. 469, 485, 499 (1989).
305. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2865 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgement in part, dissenting in part).
306. See James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431
(1985).
307. Of course, Justice Souter's hedged opinion may satisfy public opinion more
than Justice Scalia's more rigid approach or the liberals' more absolutist
protections.
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constitutional system cannot be adequately understood without
importing the English concept of "constitutional conven-
tions."308 Constitutional conventions are allocations and regu-
lations of constitutional power that the judiciary cannot effec-
tively determine and/or enforce. Conventions are formed by
circumstance and are ratified by practice and public opinion.
Examples include impeachment standards and proceedings, the
obligation of the electors in the electoral college to vote for the
presidential nominee who received the most votes in the
electors' state, and most internal worldngs of Congress.
Although it has never conceptualized such issues as "con-
stitutional conventions," the Supreme Court has cordoned off
certain constitutional disputes from meaningful judicial review.
The factor of public opinion helps justify protection of the core
structural doctrines of federalism" 9 and separation of powers:
"Probably of more importance is the public reaction engendered
by any attempt of one branch to dominate or harass another.
Even traditional political attempts to establish dominance have
met with little success owing to contrary public sentiment."310
308. See James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to
Regulate Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 645 (1992).
309. When the Warren Court was constitutionalizing numerous criminal proce-
dures, Justice Frankfurter partially justified such actions for their educative value,
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 202 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (uphold-
ing admission of allegedly coerced confession); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992).
Indeed, the Court explained how public opinion created different state and fed-
eral rights:
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained
by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under
State or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more
effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police
directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporad-
ically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively ex-
erted throughout the country.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1949) (exclusionary rule does not apply to
unreasonable search and seizure in state court); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1965) (refusing to give retroactive application of exclusionary rule
to the states). Less activist Justices were less charitable, believing federal court
interventions led to the "growing denigration of the state courts and their functions
in the public mind." Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 264 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (quoting Judge Paul C. Reardon, Address at the ABA section of
Judicial Administration annual dinner (Aug. 14, 1972)) (state need not prove that
defendant knew he had right not to consent to search).
310. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972) (bribery not protected
by Speech and Debate Clause).
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For example, the Supreme Court recently refused to review
Federal District Judge Walter Nixon's procedural challenges to
his impeachment because Nixon raised a "political ques-
tion."3 ' Congress alone will initially determine when, why,
and how someone should be impeached. The public remains the
only meaningful constraint. Because the Court cannot effective-
ly regulate either the process or substance of impeachments,
the rest of us need to develop precise constitutional conventions
to control the politicians' congressional discretion. For instance,
we should continue to support the convention, established by
the failure to impeach Justice Chase, of not impeaching Jus-
tices for their political views. Nevertheless, impeachment, a
legislative weapon that can only be effectively regulated by
public opinion,"'2 remains the final safeguard against judicial
abuses.313
1. Congressional committee investigations: A case study of law
and convention
Over a period of years, Congress has developed a set of
conventions to prevent constitutional abuses: "It is not, there-
fore, reasoning upon things as they are, to suppose that any
deliberative assembly, constituted under it, would ever assert
any other rights and powers than those which had been estab-
lished by long practice, and conceded by public opinion."314
Examples include limiting the Supreme Court to nine Justices
and refusing to use congressional power over federal jurisdic-
tion to strip the federal courts of the power to adjudicate con-
stitutional claims. Congress is another interpreter and protec-
tor of the Constitution.
315
311. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
312. Wilson, supra note 308, at 699-701.
313. In two different opinions, seven Justices held that Judge Nixon's claim
was a nonjusticiable political question. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 732. For an argument
favoring judicial review in the Nixon case, see Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching
the Senate's Use of Trial Committees, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 68 (1992).
314. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 232 (1821) (Sergeant at Arms
of House has defense to assault and battery and false imprisonment for arresting a
Member held in contempt).
315. Justice Daniel reminded the Court that it had to coexist with public opin-
ion expressed through the legislative branches:
[T]o whatever extent, therefore, the opinions of this tribunal may be rec-
ognized, (and by no one will they within their proper bounds be main-
tained with truer loyalty than by myself) yet when challenged to obedi-
ence to those opinions, I am bound to remember that the constitution is
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The investigatory powers of congressional committees pres-
ent problems that can best be resolved by a mixture of law and
convention. The Supreme Court has properly created legal
rights that even congressional committees must respect. For
above all and over all, and that public opinion conveyed through its legit-
imate channel, the legislation of the country, will cause itself to be heard
and respected.
The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dis-
senting) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to try case involving boat collision).
Such an allocation of power is not as disturbing as it might seem. Another
nineteenth-century court observed that public opinion joins the judiciary in protect-
ing constitutional rights:
[N]o serious invasion of constitutional guarantees by the legislature
could withstand for a long time the searching influence of public opinion,
which was sure to come sooner or later to the side of law, order and
justice, however it might have been swayed for a time by passion or
prejudice, or whatever aberrations might have marked its course.
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 534 (1892) (holding states can regulate fees
charged by grain elevators).
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the Court should
defer to legislative determinations of the need for a particular means to fulfill a
particular constitutional end. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-24 (1819). The Lochner
era demonstrated that such judicial deference was not always forthcoming. Because
the public-legislative assessments of necessity vary over the years, legislators can
change many constitutional arrangements:
The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and while public
opinion had gradually brought all the States as matter of fact to the
pursuit of a uniform system of popular election by general ticket, that
fact does not tend to weaken the force of contemporaneous and long con-
tinued previous practice when and as different views of expediency pre-
vailed.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1892) (holding states can determine how
members of electoral college are selected but cannot set different election date).
Congress is the best forum to "modify the law to reflect such changes in popular
attitudes." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (poll tax unconstitutional).
Committing many constitutional disputes to the Legislature does not undermine
the Constitution. "To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of
public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a
contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free peo-
ple. " Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (states can require
school students to take Pledge of Allegiance). In 1821, the Court explained how
public opinion helps develop constitutional practices:
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and
charged with the care of all that is dear to them; composed of the most
distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of
a great nation; whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be
conducted under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be
clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom
and purity can inspire ....
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821).
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example, it held that the Self-Incrimination Clause prevents
Congress from forcing individuals to testify without immuni-
ty.
316
Congress, however, is free to interrogate whomever it
wants, both to develop policy and to attempt to modify behav-
ior. The primary check on congressional investigations is public
opinion.317 It is permissible to attempt to mobilize the public
to eliminate the House Un-American Activities Committee, but
such attempts do not immunize HUAC critics from HUAC
investigations.318 The Court cannot stop all constitutional
wrongs; it cannot protect those who are being investigated from
the injury caused to their public reputations by being investi-
gated.319 Consequently, the country needs to develop addi-
tional constitutional conventions to balance Congress' "need to
know" against important individual rights and interests. For
example, the Senate recently created32' an important, desir-
able convention. Senators from both parties who were investi-
gating the leak of Anita Hills affidavit decided not to force
testimony from the reporters who first wrote about the leak of
316. One witness noted in Sweezy v. New Hampshire that the right against
self-incrimination becomes somewhat illusory when the public is enraged: "My own
reason for rejecting it is that, with public opinion in its present state, the exercise
of the privilege is almost certain to be widely misinterpreted." 354 U.S. 234, 241
n.6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (state cannot conduct investigations under the vague
phrase of "subversive persons"); see also Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 546
(1917) (House has no express power to punish contempt aside from its own
members).
317. "When the powers of legislative inquiry are abused, the remedy does not
lie in noncooperation or defiance; it is to be sought through the normal channels of
informed public opinion." Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564
n.6 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
UNVERSITIEs AND THEIR FACULTIES, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
(1953)) (state cannot dismiss employee for refusing to testify).
318. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961) (upholding House
contempt for refusing to testify on First Amendment grounds). In a prior dissent,
Justice Douglas argued that such legislative investigations were unconstitutional
because they constituted "infamy." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 448-54
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (person can be forced to testify before Committee
after being granted immunity).
319. See Hannah v. Larche, 863 U.S. 420, 500-01 (1960) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (upholding Civil Rights Commission's power to investigate without permit-
ting cross examination); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 421-23 (1958)
(Brenman, J., dissenting) (upholding discharge of employee for refusing to answer
questions about Communist affiliations); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1951) (holding Attorney General can not designate
certain groups as Communist without having a hearing).
320. Constitutional conventions can be created or modified by a single episode.
K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 180 (1951).
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Professor Hill's allegation that she was sexually harassed by
future Justice Thomas.32'
2. Public opinion, war, and peace
In Marbury v. Madison,3" Chief Justice Marshall limited
the vast scope of judicial review to legal questions. For in-
stance, the Court has little authority over such political prob-
lems as foreign policy decisions." In 1823, Chief Justice
Marshall explained how only public opinion could regulate
territorial conquest. 2 Justice Reed later argued that "meth-
ods for maintenance of Army discipline should be subject to
public opinion as expressed through Congress."3" Another
Justice concluded that only military tribunals and public opin-
ion could stop "wanton cruelty" during wartime.3" Immediate
public opinion and carefully crafted conventions remain the pri-
mary regulators of these all-important powers.
Of all the modern Supreme Court Justices, Justice Jackson
has been the most attuned to the complex, contextual relation-
ships linking constitutional law with constitutional politics.
When the Court upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War 11 in Korematsu,2 7 Jackson dissented. He
concluded that the federal district court did not have the power
to punish a Japanese-American defendant violating a camp
curfew because the federal judiciary has no jurisdiction over
such an issue. The only effective constitutional constraints
were nonjudicial:
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that
seems to me wholly delusive .... The chief restraint upon
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the
future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the polit-
ical judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judg-
321. TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNrIz, CAPITOL GAMES 431-33 (1992).
322. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
323. Id. at 165-66.
324. Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823) (holding Unit-
ed States courts cannot recognize title of land granted from Indian tribes to indi-
viduals).
325. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 43 (1955) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (ex-serviceman could not be subjected to trial by court-martial).
326. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 166 (1879) (army officer not liable for
injuries resulting from military actions or orders in Southern states under martial
law).
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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ments of history. 8'
Eight years later, Jackson apparently limited his judicial
deference to armed conflicts immediately threatening the
nation's existence. He decided that President Truman acted
unconstitutionally by seizing the country's steel mills during
the Korean War."m This time, the rule of law, expressed
through congressional legislation, congressional inaction, and
judicial decisions, prevailed over executive prerogative powers.
What had been unreviewable in World War II had become
unconstitutional. Jackson saw the President's unique relation-
ship with the body politic not as just a constraint but also as a
threat:
No other personality in public life can begin to compete with
him in access to the public mind through modem methods of
communications. By his prestige as head of state and his
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those
who are supposed to check and balance his power which often
cancels their effectiveness.330
Jackson's opinions demonstrate that many constitutional
issues should not be reduced to convention; we need a proper
mix of law and convention.33' For example, the Court proper-
ly protected the New York Times in the watershed Pentagon
Papers case, because a free press is needed to inform public
328. Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's arguments supporting the
Nuremberg trials were very different. He argued that international law was needed
to punish the major Nazi leaders who had engaged in evil acts of war. TELFORD
TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NuREMBERG TRIALS 53 (1992). The British had
initially wanted to execute the leaders without trial. Id. at 29.
329. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (preventing President from seizing and running steel mills
during wartime).
330. Id. at 653-54.
331. Prosecutorial and administrative discretion temper the rule of law with
political considerations. Except in the rarest situations, the Court does not review
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in criminal cases. Consequently,
the control of administrative discretion takes place largely outside the courtroom.
Twk Wo is the exception that proves the rule. That case held that the San Fran-
cisco Board of Supervisors violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving laundry
licenses to virtually all white applicants but no Chinese applicants. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886) (striking down racist administration of laundry
licenses). However, the Court noted: "RIn many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of
the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffirage." Id. at 370.
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opinion about foreign affairs and military conflicts."3 2 The
public, after all, cannot create and enforce conventions to pre-
vent abuses abroad if the public does not know what is happen-
ing abroad.
3. Public opinion and the judiciary
Justice Souter's argument that the Supreme Court needs
the support of the body politic is not original. A lawyer told the
Court in 1849 in The Passenger Cases: "It is desirable [that the
unelected judges] should secure the affections of the peo-
ple." "3a Judges write opinions, containing their reasoning, to
persuade public opinion:
[Als long as the judges of the United States are obliged to
express their opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them
when called upon in the usual mode, and to stand responsible
for them, not only to public opinion, but to a court of impeach-
ment, I can apprehend very little danger of the laws being
wrested to purposes of injustice.3 4
Over the decades, the judiciary and public opinion combine to
determine which judicial outcomes, which judicial reasons, and
which judicial modes of argument are constitutionally legiti-
mate.
Like impeachment, the judicial power to punish contempt
is a governmental power, arising under the law, that cannot
effectively be regulated by law alone: "The power to punish for
332. In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon exec-
utive policy and power in the areas of national defense and interna-
tional affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and
critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of dem-
ocratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press
that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of
the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there
cannot be an enlightened people.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (permitting newspapers to print stolen, classified Pentagon Papers during
Vietnam War).
333. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 379 (1849) (argument of defense
counsel) (invalidating state laws imposing taxes on foreign ship passengers).
334. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 107 (1895) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1336 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815). The
open judicial process serves as a cathartic vehicle to absorb community anger after
a violent crime has taken place. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion) (criminal trial cannot be closed to media).
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contempt is always open to abuse. The persons injured are
judges in their own case. The only safeguard, outside of public
opinion, lies in the character of the persons intrusted with this
power.""a The power will sometimes be abused by the entire
judiciary, as in In re Debs. 36 In the first volume of the Unit-
ed States Reports the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
contempt of court because the defendant's speech "prejudic[ed]
the public (a part of whom must hereafter be summoned as
jurors) with respect to the merits of a cause depending in this
court, and of corrupting the administration of justice."33 7
Just as there are costs and risks in creating discretionary
powers, there are also benefits. The Court has praised judges
who resist local pressures: "A judge who is part of such a dra-
matic episode can hardly help but know that his decision is apt
to be unpopular. But the law of contempt is not made for the
protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public
opinion." Certainly Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., who bat-
tled Southern segregation for decades, is a judicial hero.33 9
The public should closely scrutinize judicial behavior and feel
free, protected by the First Amendment," ° to criticize the ju-
335. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 723-24 (1964) (appendix) (quoting
ARTHUR P. SCoT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 174 (1930)) (emphasis
added).
336. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
337. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 319, 326 (1788) (opinion of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) (interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution to
uphold libel action against newspaper article criticizing judge); see also Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 415 (1918) (newspaper can be held
in contempt for writing article calling judge's integrity into question). But see Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversing contempt for publishing newspaper arti-
cles critical of state trial judge).
338. Craig, 331 U.S. at 376.
339. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGIH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (1981) (examining Judge Johnson's career up to his ap-
pointment to the Fifth Circuit); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Ac-
tivism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979).
340. "The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public
opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions" Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (footnote omitted) (state judges can only punish contempt
if there is "clear and present danger"). But see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) (holding that trial court could not find critical newspaper articles to be in
contempt of court). "Courts cannot function in a free country when the atmosphere
is charged with the effusions of a press designed to poison the mind of the public
against the presiding judges rather than to clarify the issues and propagate the
truth about them . . . ." Id. at 344 n.6 (quoting Pennekamp v. State, 22 So. 2d
875, 885 (Fla. 1945)).
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diciary. Judges, on the other hand, should not be intimidated
by the public. Two conflicting fears reside at the heart of this
problem. But there is no contradiction in distrusting both the
judiciary and the public; there is only common sense. Every
group has the capacity to abuse its power. Ultimately, the pub-
lic retains the last word. Not only can the public complain
about judges, but it also can pressure Congress to impeach.341
C. The Judicial Tradition Opposing the Use of Public
Opinion in Constitutional Adjudication
This survey has revealed that Justices tend to refer ex-
pressly to public opinion in the most contentious cases: Dred
Scott, the debate over the Lochner jurisprudence, Blaisdale, the
Pentagon Papers case, and Casey. Overt judicial discussion of
public opinion is a symptom of major judicial conflict.
As seen in the initial section of Casey, public opinion anal-
ysis has influenced modern substantive due process cases.342
Justice Harlan incorporated public opinion into his determina-
tion of "ordered liberty" in the first contraception case, Poe v.
Ullman.343 Public opinion of one era created the
anti-contraception statute: "The so-called Comstock Law may
be regarded as characteristic of the attitude of a large segment
of public opinion on this matter through the end of last centu-
ry.' 3  That public opinion became dated: "Indeed the
criticism of these measures assumes that they represented
There were limits to this principle; courts could bar pickets near the
courthouse because the state had the power to protect the judicial process from
being misjudged in the minds of the public. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564
(1965) (reversing conviction for picketing "near" a courthouse).
341. In 1866, an attorney in Ex parte Milligan explained: "For any wilful or
corrupt violation of their duty, they are liable to be impeached; and they cannot
escape the control of an enlightened public opinion, for they must sit with open
doors, listen to full discussion, and give satisfactory reasons for the judgments they
pronounce." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 64 (1866) (defense counsel argument) (military
courts do not have jurisdiction over civilians when civil courts are still available).
342. In her concurrence in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor cited an AMA poll: "56%
of those surveyed had told family members their wishes concerning the use of
life-sustaining treatment if they entered an irreversible coma." Cruzan v. Director
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 n.1 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, SURVEYS OF PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC OPINION ON
HEALTH CARE ISSUES 29-30 (1988)) (holding that state can require clear and con-
vincing evidence that person in coma wanted termination of life-support systems).
343. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
344. Id. at 546 n.12 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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general public opinion, though of a bygone day."345 As noted
in the Introduction, Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade partially
relied on leading "professional" public opinion, discussing the
views of the American Medical Association, the American Bar
Association, and the American Public Health Association. 6
Justice Souter's Casey opinion attempted to reconcile the
ancient tension between the Federalists and the Republicans
by incorporating both perspectives, much as Justice Johnson
had done in Hudson. " According to Justice Souter, the
Court must be committed to "principle" in order to have con-
tinued public respect and support. The Court must ignore mo-
mentary swings in public sentiment, particularly those generat-
ed by furious partisans. However, when a large percentage of
the public comes to believe that a watershed constitutional
decision was wrongly decided, as was the eventual fate of
Plessy and Lochner, the Court can and should change the basic
constitutional doctrine to incorporate that transformation in
public opinion. In such cases, the Court should also consider
the views of leading legal thinkers, such as Professor Charles
Black. In other words, constitutional "principles" are not immu-
table but are contingent creatures.
In one of the most honest judicial opinions ever written,
Justice Souter has sought to combine the stability of principle
and stare decisis with the inevitable constitutional revolutions
that sweep this country. Some constitutional thinkers, includ-
ing some of his colleagues, will not like this fluid vision of the
Constitution, but I think it accurately describes how the Con-
stitution has operated over the past two centuries.38 All law
is permanently in flux. The only question is the rate of change.
By the same token, the rejection of public opinion by Jus-
tice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Casey does not make
them constitutional revolutionaries." They can turn to a
345. Id. at 547 n.12.
346. 410 U.S. 113, 141-47 (1973). Justice Blackmun's opinion is overly defer-
ential to the medical profession; Roe sometimes reads more like a right to practice
medicine case than a privacy case.
347. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
348. In addition, Justice Souter's approach is consistent with the views of
many constitutional thinkers, on and off the Court.
349. Justice Thomas cited a book arguing that the judiciary's insularity makes
it attractive to leftist lawyers. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 905 n.4 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25 (1973)) (defendant barred in collater-
al review from raising new constitutional rule challenging death sentence).
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smaller group of cases to formulate a different judicial tradi-
tion. Unless one wants to transform the Constitution into a
purely majoritarian document, the Court must protect some
"core" rights from prevailing public opinion. Justice Jackson's
Barnette opinion eloquently stated the Court's obligation:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they de-
pend on the outcome of no elections.50
In 1827, Justice Johnson, author of the Hudson opinion,
equated "public opinion" with the politics side of the
law/politics distinction: "[Acquiescing to unfounded doctrines
and dicta] affords facilities for giving an undue bias to public
opinion, and, I will add, of interpolating doctrines which belong
not to the law."3 "1 Recall that Justice Story also separated
"principle" from "popular appeal" in Dartmouth College. We
have already seen how Chief Justice Taney's opinion'in Dred
Scott explicitly repudiated current public opinion: "Any other
rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion
or passion of the day." 52
In the 1880s, members of the formalistic Supreme Court
isolated themselves from public opinion: "The truth is, that
public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging back-
ward and forward to extreme lengths."5 They praised Eng-
350. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(state cannot require schoolchildren to take Pledge of Allegiance). Justice Jackson
added:
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these begin-
nings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of
the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.
Id. at 641.
351. Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 614 (1827) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
352. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
353. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
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lish judges for their capacity to transcend their fellow citi-
zens.3" Such judicial arrogance helped set the stage for the
Lochner era, in which the Court ignored, at great cost to the
country, radical changes in the economy, technology, and public
opinion."' In addition to quoting favorably the above state-
ment from Dred Scott, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell Justice Sutherland argued: "The Constitution is a
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted it means now."" 6
Justice Souter's Casey opinion could also be criticized on
the ground that no Supreme Court had ever applied his partic-
ular conception of public opinion. Furthermore, many Justices
have separated the judicial domain, excluding public opinion,
from the political domain, where public opinion reigns su-
preme. In other words, Justice Scalia might argue that Justice
Souter has not properly adhered to the Supreme Court's "tradi-
tion." Justice Souter's argument, however, resembles the Hud-
son decision: he consults both the public and leading legal
scholars like Professor Charles Black to determine whether-or
not a watershed case should be overruled. Justice Scalia's tra-
dition of pure judicial autonomy from public opinion, based
upon Osborn, Dred Scott, and Sutherland's Blaisdell dissent,
proves, at best, that at least two competing "traditions" can be
teased out of the cases.
The historical record is rich, not easily susceptible to a
single interpretation. It is notoriously difficult to "prove" any-
(upholding law prohibiting federal officials from giving or receiving anything from
any other officer for political reasons). Justice McClean's dissent in Dred Scott con-
demned the pro-slavery change in state law caused by "some new light" or "excited
public opinion." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 563 (McClean, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855)) (published version of
law prevails over unpublished version). In Pease v. Peck, the Court rejected a then
recent precedent because it reflected excited public opinion:
When the decisions of the state court. are not consistent, we do not feel
bound to follow the last, if it is contrary to our own convictions,-and
[sic] much more is this the case, where, after a long course of consistent
decisions, some new light suddenly springs up, or an excited public opin-
ion has elicited new doctrines, subversive of former safe precedent.
59 U.S. at 599.
354. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 140 (1895) (Gray, J., dis-
senting).
355. For a contrary view, see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence
and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
356. 290 U.S. 398, 450 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting South Caro-
lina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
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thing in constitutional law, particularly what is or is not a
"tradition." Those observations contain an additional problem
for Justice Scalia. The characterization of a constitutionally
valid tradition involves another subjective choice between com-
peting definitions. Justice Scalia, however, has tried to use the
tradition argument to formulate "objective" law. In other words,
Justice Scalia endorses arguments that he believes will
eliminate indeterminacy and subjective choice. The historical
record presented in this Article demonstrates the futility of
such a quest, whether in determining a "tradition" or defining
"public opinion. " "'
Interpretive irony colors Justice Scalia's approach. At the
end of Casey, he graphically describes the sullen portrait of
Chief Justice Taney, painted after Dred Scott, in Harvard Law
School's library. Justice Scalia noted that Chief Justice Taney's
opinion failed to reunite the country and predicted that Justice
Souter's opinion will probably meet a similar fate. Yet, Justice
Scalia's constitutional methodology reproduces Chief Justice
Taney's rigid commitment to text and ratification history. In
addition, Chief Justice Taney's ruthless twisting of the Terri-
tories Clause, finding that Congress had no power to regulate
slavery in any new territories under that Clause,358 neither
persuaded much of the country nor removed the Court from
political controversy. Over a hundred years ago, Chief Justice
Taney's decision demonstrated that an explicit, exclusive ap-
peal to text and history, combined with express repudiation of
existing public opinion, is not invariably the best mode of con-
stitutional interpretation. The Court's ultimate decisions tend
to drag it into political controversy far more than its choice of
interpretive techniques.
A Scalian might retort that Justice Scalia never banished
public opinion from the constitutional universe. One of the
goals of objectifying the law is to separate law from politics,
principle from policy. That distinction cannot be made without
being aware of what is on the other side, namely, public opin-
ion. Public opinion is something that takes place outside the
courtroom. Sometimes it is to be feared and other times to be
protected.
357. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
349 (1992); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defi-
nition of Rights, 57 U. CR. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
358. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432-51.
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Justice Scalia, of course, does not completely keep public
opinion out of the adjudicatory process. An "originalist," he con-
sults text and history to determine what the populace thought
when they ratified a particular part of the Constitution. Fur-
thermore, Justice Scalia accepts more contemporary public
opinion expressed through legislation, which transforms other-
wise suspect opinion into constitutional tradition: "The public
sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions
may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objec-
tive indicator of contemporary values upon which we can re-
lyo-2359
Justice Scalia has not only dismissed the long-standing
judicial tradition of expressly incorporating public opinion into
constitutional analysis in a variety of ways, but he also has
created a model that is internally inconsistent. How can Justice
Scalia ignore public opinion when he counts statutes and prac-
tices to determine what is or is not a constitutionally protected
"tradition"? Despite the myriad imperfections of our democratic
system, statutes are reflections of dominant public opinion. Is
not the "legislative mind" similar to the "public mind"? In
Furman Justice Powell noted the powerful link between legisla-
tion and public opinion: "In a democracy the first indicator of
the public's attitude must always be found in the legislative
judgments of the people's chosen representatives."36 °
Justice Scalia aspires to create an objective constitutional
jurisprudence that precludes the Court from imposing any
subjective values on the electorate. That goal is impossible
because the subjective/objective distinction cannot resolve con-
stitutional questions, which require inherently norma-
tive/subjective choices between competing conceptions of the
Good.361 Nevertheless, we need to determine the appropriate
scope of judicial review. Few of us want the Court to become
too idiosyncratic, too unaware of the rest of the country. Justice
Scalia's "tradition" argument limits judicial discretion by link-
ing it more closely with the views of the general public as ex-
pressed through statutes. Tradition, thus, becomes a legitimate,
but not an "objective," technique. But that interpretation forces
the Court to weigh public opinion, not exclude it or give it de-
terminate force. The questions are whose public opinion
359. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
360. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436-37 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
361. See HORWlTZ, TRANSFOPMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at 139.
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counts-the legislators', the commentators', and/or the average
citizens'-and how much that opinion should count in a partic-
ular case, not whether public opinion is relevant at all.
Unlike many other methods of ascertaining public opinion,
Justice Scalia's technique does not have many methodological
problems. After all, he only consults constitutional text, histori-
cal writings, and written statutes. But, he still has the problem
of subjectively interpreting the objective statutory survey of the
statutes in question. One can never be certain what the Court
will do when it has completed its arithmetic. For example, the
Court ignored the absence of statutory authority in Powell v.
Alabama,"2 requiring all the states to provide free lawyers to
indigent defendants facing the death penalty. In Coker v. Geor-
gia,3" the Court struck down the death penalty for rape as
disproportionate, partially because only a few states authorized
the penalty. In 1981, the Court deferred to a mixture of legisla-
tive procedures regulating the termination of parental rights,
although the majority of states were moving in the direction of
providing counsel: "[S]ignificantly, 33 States and the District of
Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in
termination cases. The Court's opinion today in no way implies
that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opin-
ion and now widely followed by the States are other than en-
lightened and wise."3" Perhaps Justice Scalia is saying that
the Court will only provide constitutional protection when all
the legislatures have consistently protected a right. But under
such a model, he has created an elaborate, unnecessary, con-
fusing fiction. What plaintiff need bring a constitutional action
if all the states already acknowledge that plaintiff's rights on
other grounds?
Justice Scalia has not consistently excluded public opinion
from his formulation of constitutional doctrine. Dissenting in
FWIPBS v. Dallas,365 he wrote that the Supreme Court's ob-
scenity standards, which protect erotic material, have "met
with general public acceptance,"366 but the application of
those standards has "most certainly not [been] approved."367
362. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
363. 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion).
364. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (not re-
quiring court-appointed counsel in termination of parental rights cases).
365. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
366. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
367. Id.
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He pointed to continuing efforts to combat "sexually oriented
businesses" to prevent "the erosion of public morality" through
techniques such as zoning ordinances.368 Justice Scalia tried
to resolve this public reaction by allowing communities to pro-
scribe businesses that distribute vast amounts of sexually ori-
ented material as engaged in "the sordid business of pander-
ing," even though those communities could not ban any single
work."6 9 Whether his creative doctrine should have become
constitutional law or not, Justice Scalia's methodology sits
uneasily with his complaints in Casey about Justice Souter's
use of public opinion. It is very difficult, not to mention unde-
sirable, to exclude a valuable form of constitutional interpreta-
tion from all decisions.
Some of Justice Scalia's goals become less objectionable
after removing the distracting adjective "objective." The Court
needs to have a dual conception of constitutional power, sepa-
rating the political from the legal, public opinion from legal
rights. This Article has attempted to show that the two cate-
gories have never been, and should not, be mutually exclusive.
Some overlap is inevitable, even desirable.
Eventually public opinion will have its way,30 expressly
amending the Constitut.on or forcing the Court to respond to
the "felt necessities of the time[s]." ' The most obvious exam-
ple was the repudiation of economic substantive due process
during the Depression. In 1992, a large segment of the public
validated the right of privacy as applied to abortion when it
overwhelmingly voted for the two pro-choice candidates,
Clinton and Perot."7 2 That election helps explain how judicial
368. Id. at 251-52.
369. Id. at 260. In formulating this standard, Justice Scalia quoted a prior
statement by Justice Stevens on the limits of principle: "We learned long ago that
broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in context they are made, are
sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated
principle is reached." American Mini Theaters v. Young, 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976),
quoted in FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 263.
370. Robert Goldwin observed that "public opinion and popular taste rule, ulti-
mately, on everything." Robert A. Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Mo-
rality in the Constitution, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
15 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979).
371. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963)
(1881).
372. Some political scientists have concluded that the abortion controversy
played a major role in the 1992 presidential election. David S. Broder, Lasting Ef-
fects of Perot, Religious Right Debated; Each Likely to Remain a Force, Scholars
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at A6. In a famous passage, Ely applied modern
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review in general, and the doctrine of substantive due process
in particular, can legitimately exist in our form of democratic
government. To paraphrase Tocqueville, the people have con-
tinued to permit the Court to engage in substantive due pro-
cess review.37 3 Former Judge Bork learned the price of defy-
ing public opinion when he argued that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not outlaw sex discrimination because that issue was
not on the Framers' minds. The seating on the Supreme Court
of Justice Ginsburg, a leading early advocate of gender equali-
ty, confirms the public's power to participate in the perpetual
reinterpretation of the Constitution.
D. A Matter of Principles
One way to narrow most of the cases discussed above is to
assert that the Court has usually considered public opinion as
something outside the courtroom. The Court has seen public
opinion as a threat in many criminal cases, something to be
protected in First Amendment cases, or an independent ad-
judicator of some structural issues. The acutely controversial
problem is whether or not the Court should sometimes let pub-
lic opinion "inside" its doctrine, allowing public opinion to influ-
ence directly the types of constitutional rights and powers that
the Court has traditionally determined. In other words, should
public opinion help shape the contours of fundamental rights
and/or compelling state interests? The Court has consulted
public opinion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual
punishments"; can the Court also use public opinion to limit
the scope of constitutional rights and principles? To begin to
answer those questions, we need to consider the relationship
between politics and principles.
Many legal scholars have criticized Herbert Wechsler's fa-
mous article on "neutral principles,"374 both as a general idea
political philosophy to constitutional adjudication: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick.
We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." ELY, supra note 9, at 58. Ely will not be much
more pleased with a crude reduction of this Article's argument: "Anti-abortionist
President Bush won only 37% of the popular vote in 1992 against two pro-choice
candidates. We win, 5-4. Roe affirmed. Statute upheld under undue burden test"
For discussions of the Court's relationship to electoral politics, see David
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIs. L.
REV. 790; Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 795 (1975).
373. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 100.
374. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
1037] 1125
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and as applied to criticize Brown v. Board of Education."'
There were both substantive and methodological problems.
How and why should the Court limit itself to "neutral" princi-
ples, and how the Court could determine which principles are
"neutral"? In short, who knows what the adjective "neutral"
means?376
The word "principle" presents a related set of prob-
lems. 77 Are "principles" anything more than "values," dressed
up in academically and legally acceptable language, that courts
ought to take seriously, applying them consistently until they
collide with other principles?7" Such a query has its own tra-
dition. In 1882, Jevons wrote in the context of legislation: "It is
futile to attempt to uphold in regard to social legislation any
theory of eternal fixed principles or abstract rights."379 Yet, a
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
375. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
376. See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at 170; Jan G.
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Cass R. Sunstein, Neu-
trality in Constitutional Law (Witlt Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).
377. Such doubts have a tradition: "Radical neo-realism seems to deny that
there are rules or principles or conceptions or doctrines at all." Roscoe Pound, The
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1931). Although some
thought he overreacted, Pound's complaint had substance:
Some Progressive critics (who came to include the 'Legal Realists' of the
1920's and 30's) delighted not only in showing the class bias of Liberal le-
galisms, but in exploding its aspirations to technical coherence: The fa-
mous 'principles' were exposed as empty formulae that could lead by
logical manipulation, to totally contradictory results.
PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 362 (3d ed. 1992). Professor Brest never-
theless has proposed a different set of principles as essential parts of the judicial
function: "[W]here the very authority of the judiciary is based on its ability to
expound and apply general principles, it cannot act on such an ad hoc basis [as a
school board]." Paul Brest, Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1976); see also Ronald
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992) (arguing that the distinction between enumerated and
unenumerated rights is "bogus"). Morton Horwitz noted that the search for "un-
derlying universal principles" is a relatively new one, "virtually unknown" to the
common law for over the previous 500 years. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1870-
1960, supra note 44, at 201.
378. "The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it al-
ways retains old ones from history at the other .... " HOLMES, supra note 371, at
32.
379. W. STANELY JEVONS, THE STATE IN RELATION TO LABOUR 16 (3d ed.
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powerful tradition exists that perceives the Court as principled.
Alexander Bickel characterized the Court as an institution
dedicated to principle. 80 Justice Powell wrote: "Congress is
not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific dis-
putes between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is
to be representative rather than impartial, to make policy rath-
er than to apply settled principles of law."' 1
The word "principle" loses some of its import because it
often is used simply as another word for "doctrine." Even
Langdell did not make a clear distinction: "Law, considered as
a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines." 82 The
Supreme Court has often equated "principle" with modifiable
doctrine."a
How can public opinion coexist with legal principles inside
constitutional doctrine? The short answer may be that some
fundamental rights are more fundamental than others. The
Court has always created an hierarchy of rights, determining
which interests are "fundamental."38 There is, and ought to
be, a small set of "core" fundamental rights that the Court
should isolate from public opinion, particularly majori-
1894), quoted in DICEY, supra note 43, at 446. Dicey extended Jevon's analysis
beyond social legislation to judicial decision-making. More recently, Mark Tushnet
has criticized neutral principles because they are open to substantial manipulation.
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 46-47 (1988); see also Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
380. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
Even Bickel concedes that the word "principle" is ambiguous, partially aspirational.
Id. at 199-200; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 469 (1981).
381. Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(upholding minority set-asides for federal construction contracts). Chief Justice
Warren wrote: "[Plarticularly in the Supreme Court, the basic ingredient of decision
is principle, and it should not be compromised and parceled out." EARL WARREN,
THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 6 (1977); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial
Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837
(arguing that "result-oriented" decision-making is unprincipled).
382. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi
(1871).
383. For a judicial example, see the Supreme Court's claim in Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States that it complied with E.C. Knight's "principle" that
the manufacturing of sugar was not interstate commerce, even though the
Addyston Court held that manufacturing steel pipes was interstate commerce.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246-48 (1899) (distin-
guishing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)).
384. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1127 1993
1128 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1993
ty/legislative opinion. The Court, for instance, should be partic-
ularly anti-majoritarian when formulating First Amendment
rights.385 The Court needs to protect both minority viewpoints
and the processes that lead to informed public opinion from
suppression by passionate public opinion, be it in the form of
an elected official, an agency, a statutory act, or an angry mob.
We will, of course, disagree over which rights are "core" rights.
There are, however, a few such "core" rights that most of us be-
lieve are non-negotiable: the right to free speech, the right to a
basically equal vote in state elections, and the right not to be
expressly, maliciously discriminated against on the basis of
race, gender, ethnicity, or religion. In those situations, the
Court should prefer formal rules, elevating those "principles"
over politics. Most other issues are murkier, more contextual,
more amenable to compromise. In other words, we can use the
word "principle" so long as we don't take it too seriously.
Constitutional law, like all law, frequently involves the
allocation of inevitable suffering. The Court creates formalistic
doctrine that accepts ongoing injury, whether that injury be
Jerry Falwell's anguish at seeing his mother's reputation
dragged through the mud,"88 or black contractors having to
contend against societal racial discrimination after City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.8 ' When determining which par-
ty should bear the burden, the Court must sift among several
modes of argument that do not always favor one side over an-
other: text, history, precedent, tradition, policy, morality, and
structure. Public opinion simply is another variable. Sometimes
the Court should consider public opinion to be irrelevant or
even threatening; but, at other times, the Court ought to tailor
its decisions to the country's prevailing mood.
The task will not be easy. There are institutional and
methodological difficulties in determining any form of public
opinion. Justices do not face the electorate or have frequent
385. Skepticism can coexist with a hierarchy of principles: "To have doubted
one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man." Oliver W. Holmes, Ideals
and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915). The trick is not to confuse operating prin-
ciples that one pretends are absolute with the notion of immutable absolutes. See,
e.g., GORE VIDAL, Novelists and Critics of the 1940's, in UNITED STATES: ESSAYS
1952-1992, at 12-13 (1993) (discussing the lack of absolutes in literary criticism). In
other words relativism and existentialism need not lead to nihilism.
386. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment pro-
tects offensive parody of public figure).
387. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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contacts with lobbyists. Polls are unreliable and fickle, while
intuitive assessments of public opinion often are little more
than projections of the Justice's personal beliefs. One of the
Court's more awkward moments arose when it seemed to re-
solve a sex discrimination case on the assumed passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment." Assuming the Court will consid-
er public opinion in a particular case, the Court next has the
difficult task of choosing between the many forms of public
opinion." 9 Even if the Court can determine when and what
public opinion is relevant, it then must decide how much
weight that particular kind of public opinion should receive.
For instance, Justice Souter's approach forces him to determine
when a watershed decision has been accepted, merely disputed,
or so rejected by such a substantial majority that it should be
overruled.
Because all of us have different rankings of constitutional
norms, the best way for me to demonstrate the influence of
public opinion on constitutional analysis is to discuss several
cases in which the courts made "unprincipled" compromises
that I initially disagreed with. The tests of time and public
opinion however, have given those decisions more validity.
9 °
Affirmative action recently has been one of the country's
more divisive issues. Both factions have powerful arguments.
Opponents favor the "color blind" Constitution over proponents'
388. "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are in-
herently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (army must provide
same benefits to men and women).
389. This Article demonstrates that many definitions of public opinion have
permeated constitutional theory and doctrine. Theorists and judges have used Zeit-
geist, reputation, honor, approbation, elite public opinion, public opinion of the
masses, reasoned public opinion, passionate public opinion, mob, views of partisans,
perspective of the body politic, enlightened, lawyers, reflective and informed reac-
tions, judgment of history, world opinion, views of the Framers, views of the popu-
lace at the time of any constitutional ratification, prevailing views, statutory law,
tradition, a threat to liberty, and a guarantor of liberty.
390. I have long believed that the Supreme Court should interpret the Consti-
tution to do more for the poor. See James Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
391 (1990). However, no powerful faction is clamoring for such a jurisprudence.
Public domestic discourse presently swirls around race and sex more than class.
Perhaps the Court is wise in leaving to the elected branches the resolution of the
systematic abuse and neglect of poor young children during the late twentieth
century. But such wisdom is paltry, providing no honor either to the Court or to
the people it serves.
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pleas for equal opportunity and just compensation for past
injustices."9 ' Many people criticized Justice Powell's control-
ling, solo opinion in Bakke392 for prohibiting racial quotas
while holding that universities could consider race as a factor
to achieve "diversity." In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
chided Justice Powell for allowing universities to reach the
same end of more minorities in the classroom under the rubric
of "diversity" instead of "social discrimination," but only
through less candid means of factors instead of quotas. In the
1990s, Justice Scalia has sought to eliminate all affirmative
action except "where ... [it] is necessary [for the states] to
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
classification." 93 As a matter of principle, both Justice
Brennan and Justice Scalia offer more coherent doctrine. Ei-
ther the Court should find virtually all affirmative action plans
to be unconstitutional, or it should generally defer to the
majoritarian process.
What is the practical difference between a quota and mak-
ing race a factor? Justice Powell seems to have
constitutionalized hypocrisy in Bakke. Yet, Justice Powell's
opinion has withstood the test of time, within the Court and in
the court of public opinion. Both political sides currently use
Justice Powell's rhetoric. Affirmative action critics attack "quo-
tas," while advocates praise "diversity." Justice Powell's awk-
ward compromise better reflects the country's ambivalence
about the issue than Justices Brennan's and Scalia's purer
conceptions of constitutional rights. Affirmative action was
bound to strain the country's political and social fabric. Justice
Powelrs compromise has allowed a diluted form of affirmative
action to exist for almost twenty years, providing many educa-
tional opportunities for minorities without alienating the rest
of America from the Court. Critical Legal scholars like Roberto
Unger might see Justice Powell's decision as proof of antimo-
nies that reduce liberalism to incoherence and contradic-
tion.3" I see his opinion as a prime example of liberalism's
capacity to compromise.
391. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1991).
392. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
393. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
394. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
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In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court refused to extend busing
from the inner cities into the suburbs. 9 ' Milliken undercut
Brown v. Board of Education's commitments to equal opportu-
nity, equal education, and reduction of psychological injury to
black children. 9 The constitutional text does not distinguish,
as the Court did, between states and local governments formed
by the states. As a matter of policy, inner-city busing increased
middle-class flight.397 Doctrinally, the Court easily could have
extended desegregation into the suburbs. The Court previously
had found that violations within a school district tainted the
entire district,39 but it refused in Milliken to find that simi-
lar violations could cross municipal boundaries within the same
urban community.
The conservatives' claim in Milliken that the State was not
responsible for city boundaries is inaccurate because municipal-
ities are creatures of the state. The conservatives themselves
quickly jettisoned that argument when it no longer suited
them. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, Justice
Powell, who was part of the Milliken majority, wrote, 'The
Constitution does not dictate to the States a particular division
of authority... between state and local governing bodies."399
In other words, the state has ultimate responsibility for all
education decisions. It would seem that proof of intentional
discrimination in one part of the state's system, Detroit, should
spill over to the rest of the state's system, the suburbs, just as
proof of segregation in part of a school district polluted the
entire district in Keyes. More realistically, it is commonly be-
lieved that many people fled to the suburbs to isolate them-
selves from blacks and the poor. The legal fictions of "intent"
and local boundaries prevailed over the inner-city
schoolchildren's need for a quality, equal education, cleansed of
state-facilitated racism. The Court completed its defense of the
suburbs by protecting them from racial housing integration in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.4 °0 and from equal school subsidies in San Antonio
395. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
396. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); see Sonia R.
Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992).
397. See generally J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985).
398. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
399. 458 U.S. 457, 492-93 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The liberals, of
course, also flip-flopped. The state-local distinction was irrelevant in Milliken but
became crucial in Washington.
400. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that respondents failed to show racially dis-
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Independent School District v. Rodriguez." ' Overall, the con-
servatives reflected the powerful suburban wish to be isolated
from the anguish of the inner city.
In terms of precedent, immediate policy, morality, princi-
ple, and even text,"2 I believe the Court grossly erred in cas-
es like Milliken. On the other hand, the best justification for
Milliken is the mood of the predominantly white suburbs,
which expressed their views at the time of Milliken by electing
Richard Nixon to the Presidency. If the Court had tried to
integrate the suburbs by itself, a powerful part of the citizenry
would have become enraged. At the very least, many suburban-
ites would have pulled their children out of the suburban pub-
lic schools, undercutting the goals and benefits of racial and
economic integration. Legislatures would engage in a variety of
subterfuges, entangling the federal courts in ugly, perpetual
conflicts. 40 3 We want constitutional law to reflect and appeal
to our better sides, but the Court is also committed to maintain
social stability and harmony. It must balance moral aspirations
against societal constraints. It must practice realpolitik, trying
to determine how particular groups will react to its decisions.
Political reality, a major policy variable, may justify an other-
wise unjustifiable decision.
Although I express these depressing arguments reluctant-
ly, there is a slight glimmer of hope within them. Perhaps one
day the country will be more willing to share its pains and
benefits, giving the Court the leeway to mandate a more egali-
tarian, racially just, educational system that provides equal
opportunity to all. The Court could start with more equal fund-
ing, not more disruptive, counterproductive busing. Recent
state court efforts to require equal funding for all public schools
may provide some answers. However, based upon the 1993
criminatry intent in challenged rezoning decision).
401. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Milliken might have been less damaging if the Court
had decided Rodriguez the other way. The dual system Rodriguez tolerated has
been fiercely criticized. See JONATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 214-19 (1991).
402. As has been written many other places, the text of "equal protection" is
open to many meanings. For example, Ronald Dworkin distinguished between the
Framers' particular conception of a text and the text's broader "concept." RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1977).
403. For a recent example of adverse public reaction, see Sam H. Verhovek,
Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A12.
404. This Article provides a way to distinguish and limit opinions like
Milliken, a way to overcome them as precedent, while also giving them more
short-term legitimacy.
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Texas vote not to equalize school funding, there is little reason
for short-term optimism.
40 5
Public opinion analysis reminds us of the intimate relation-
ship between rights and remedies. The Court may be unwilling,
or unable, to fully protect a "right" because any meaningful
remedy would be ineffective, even counterproductive. The right,
abstractly expressed, might not seem too controversial until the
Court considers the range of viable remedies. Few will argue in
the abstract against "equal educational opportunity." But,
equalizing public school payments could lead to more rich and
middle-class flight out of the entire public school system, there-
by increasing electoral opposition to increased funding of any
public schools. Like it or not, the Court has sacrificed Brown's
broadest aspirations of equal, non-injurious education for
African-Americans to the suburban public opinion. Only the
"core" right of not being forced by the state to attend racially
segregated public schools remains untouched.
While it is easy to criticize such opinions, liberals should
be aware of the political costs of constitutionalizing their entire
political agenda. Conservatives can develop a broader political
coalition, combining social/religious conservatives, who are
particularly irked by decisions like Roe v. Wade"' and those
banning prayers in schools,407 with libertarians and free mar-
keteers, who know their social rights will not be affected so
long as the Court does not become too conservative or deferen-
tial. Although there seems little doubt that the American econ-
omy was the determinative factor,4"8  William Jefferson
Clinton might not have become President if the Court had not
decided against homosexuals4 °9 in Bowers v. Hardwick,41 °
405. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (striking down school financing legislation as
imposing unconstitutional ad valorem tax); see also Allen W. Hubsch, Education
and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18
J.L. & EDUC. 93 (1989). But see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (strik-
ing down finance provision of state education act for insufficient provision for poor-
er school districts).
406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
408. But see Charles R. Morris, "It's Not the Economy, Stupid," ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1993, at 49 (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect the President
to have much influence over the economy).
409. See generally Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1992 (Magazine), at 18 (discussing the rising power of the gay electorate).
410. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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threatened abortion rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,41' and gagged doctors in Rust v. Sullivan."2 Many
wealthy homosexuals and corporate feminists prefer the eco-
nomic policies of the Republicans and the social politics of the
Democrats. In the crucial electoral state of California, homosex-
uals make up an important part of the voting electorate.413 A
liberal, activist Supreme Court, with a firm majority, allows
such swing voters to have it both ways. In other words, the
Brennan-Marshall constitutional jurisprudence certainly made
political sense to many, including this author. But if those two
Justices had succeeded, they might have created a formidable
conservative coalition that would dominate the country today.
One of the ironies of the modern American system is that one
of the political conservatives' best friends is an activist, liberal
court.
4 14
V. CONCLUSION
The primary question this Article has sought to answer is
the role of public opinion in constitutional adjudications, theo-
ries, and controversies. This Article concludes that Justice
Souter's Casey opinion is somewhat more consistent with Amer-
ican constitutional tradition than the views of Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehtquist, whose interpretive techniques
echo Chief Justice Taney and Justice Sutherland in completely
refusing to consider contemporary public opinion. It should not
be very surprising that the Court has paid so much attention to
public opinion over the years; our democratic system is pre-
mised upon popular sovereignty and public participation.
This Article has not offered any easy method, any
three-prong test, to determine which definitions of public opin-
ion should be admitted into constitutional adjudication and
how much weight those definitions should be given. The Article
only argues that public opinion does and should enter the
multi-factored, balancing equation that is also known as consti-
tutional law. I am certainly not recommending that the Court
jettison all precedent and "principle," consulting only Gallup
411. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
412. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
413. See Schmalz, supra note 409.
414. It is possible that there is some deep structure within the Constitution
that tends to drive political issues back to the center, towards a political equilibri-
um.
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polls. The Court must decide which "core" rights are largely
immunized from public will. Public opinion, however defined,
can lead to deadly outcomes.415
The Supreme Court is caught in a dilemma when engaging
in crowd control.416 If the Court refuses to consider public
opinion, it can quickly generate opinions like Dred Scott,
Lochner and even Roe v. Wade.417 Even the two Brown deci-
sions, which refused to let racist regional sentiment determine
fundamental constitutional rights, compromised with those
sentiments by implementing desegregation at "all deliberate
speed."418 Many of us do not want anyone to push their prin-
ciples to logical extremes, ignoring external realities. More gen-
erally, it is doubtful that there are any absolute rights or abso-
lute powers.419 Yet, if the Court frequently includes elaborate
assessments of the public mood in its opinions, the law becomes
ever more indeterminate, a potentially thin shield against ma-
jority tyranny.
Part of the answer to this Polonius-like waffling lies in
rhetoric. The Court writes opinions in part to convince the rest
of us of the correctness of its decision.420 There are many rea-
415. Gore Vidal recalled "in 1935 when the Nazis solemnly determined that
anything is punishable if it was deserving of punishment according 'to the funda-
mental conceptions of penal law and sound popular feeling.'" Gore Vidal, Sex and
the Law, in UNITED STATES: ESSAYS 1952-1992, at 530 (1993). Vidal also recounts
"In response to public opinion, the Emperor Justinian made homosexuality a crimi-
nal offense of the grounds that buggery, as everyone knew, was the chief cause of
earthquakes." Id. at 531. This leads him to conclude: "At any given moment, public
opinion is a chaos of superstition, mis-information, and prejudice. Even if one could
accurately interpret it, would that be a reason for basing the law upon a consen-
sus?" Id. at 536.
416. For those of us who work in offices and work with words, preferring
briefs to bombs, "public opinion" is frequently a polite metaphor for the mob: never
completely knowable, always unpredictable, and potentially dangerous. "Public opin-
ion" is the Other, the crowd that we lawyers try to control.
417. One of the risks of the plastic doctrine of substantive due process, wheth-
er practiced by the Lochner Court or the Roe Court, is that the Court can be
tempted by early successes to miscalculate. For example, public acceptance of
Griswold's protection of contraception among married couples led the Court to
believe the Country was also indifferent about abortion. The subsequent fury over
Roe may help explain why the Court was later unwilling to protect homosexuals in
Bowers.
418. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
419. "For one thing, no principles of law, or of anything else, can be guaran-
teed good past the next revolution." GRANT GILiORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 68
(1974).
420. "On every case which lawfully invokes the action of these powers, this
Court, I trust, will not hesitate to exert it, that it will, by so doing, 'plant' itself in
public opinion and confidence, on an 'impregnable position!'" Holmes v. Jennison,
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sons why a Justice will reach a particular decision, but some
are not rhetorically acceptable. Justice Blackmun may have
reached his decision in Roe partially because he had been gen-
eral counsel for the Mayo Clinic. Justice Scalia's hostility to
Roe may reflect his Catholicism. Justice Kennedy allegedly
changed his mind in Casey because of letters from a pro-choice
nun.421 The Justices need not always put such "reasons" into
opinions." The Court has a duty to tell the truth about the
reasons it chooses, but it need not tell the whole truth." The
Court must present arguments that the public will accept,
reasons that almost certainly will change over the decades.
Justice Souter's remarkable degree of candor should be seen as
an exception to the rules of constitutional discourse.
Ironically, the American people seem to prefer a Court that
does not expressly ground its opinions on public opinion, at
least most of the time. The public wants its Constitution and
Court to be both predictable and largely immune from momen-
tary public passions. However, the public expects its Constitu-
tion to respond to fundamental shifts in cultural consciousness.
Consequently, the Court needs to be aware of the public mood
but should not try to calibrate its opinions too finely. The Court
takes a longer-term view of the political process, sometimes
forcing the majority to develop a supermajority through the
amendment process to overrule judicial decision or at least to
develop a political coalition that can eventually transform the
Court through presidential appointments. The additional time
and energy needed to accomplish such goals may generate
enough reflection to prevent the creation of odious constitution-
al text or doctrine. 4
Whether American lawyers like it or not, we live in a cul-
ture that is saturated by many forms of public opinion." The
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 632-33 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (appendix I).
421. David G. Savage, The Court's Rescue of Roe vs. Wade, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1992, at Al, A22.
422. It is both hard and undesirable to weed all doctrinal formalism out of
constitutional adjudication. See Wilson, supra note 306.
423. But see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 731 (1987).
424. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895) (in-
validating federal tax on real and personal property as unconstitutional unappor-
tioned direct tax).
425. The role of public opinion helps answer Professor Bobbit's argument that
constitutional judging can be reduced to judicial "conscience," PHILIP BMWBIT, CON-
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991), and Professor Tushnet's emphasis on charac-
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public will eventually repudiate or constrain unpopular judicial
developments. Examples range from Lochner's substantive due
process, to Justices Brennan's and Marshall's attempts to
constitutionalize liberal social policy, to anger by doctors, femi-
nists, and libertarians over the Rehnquist Court's unwilling-
ness to protect abortion rights by permitting the federal gov-
ernment to "gag" abortion speech in federally funded clinics in
Rust v. Sullivan.426
Denial is not the answer. Better to admit that constitution-
al adjudication is a difficult process that involves both compro-
mise and guesswork. The Court needs to decide which issues, if
any, should be influenced by public opinion. It then needs to
define which "public opinion" it is considering, to determine
what that public believes, to establish the weight to be given
such opinion, and to conclude whether it should expressly dis-
cuss public opinion at all. Adding these questions to all the
other factors the Court must consider demonstrates the com-
plex process that lies behind the phrase "constitutional inter-
pretation."
All of which brings us full circle to Justice Souter's Casey
opinion. Using a balancing approach, the "undue burden" test,
he closely analyzed Pennsylvania's statutory constraints on
abortion rights, upholding an informed consent provision427
but striking down a spousal notification section.41 Such com-
promises will not satisfy those who believe that a woman's
autonomy or bodily integrity generates an absolute right to
abortion.429 Abortion opponents will be even more distraught
ter, Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U.
L. REv. 747 (1992). Admittedly, character and conscience are very important: "The
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high com-
petence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique
upon its work" Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). But
public opinion constrains the choice of judicial arguments and judicial outcomes.
Judges who stray face reversals if they sit on lower courts, derision on and off the
bench, declining influence over future cases caused by lack of respect and coopera-
tion, and even impeachment in extreme situations.
426. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). One of President Clinton's first decisions was to
eliminate the regulation establishing the gag rule. Robin Toner, Clinton Orders
Reversal of Abortion Restrictions Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1993, § 1, at 1.
427. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824-26. The joint opinion also upheld a record-keep-
ing requirement. Id. at 2832-33.
428. Id. at 2826-31.
429. Casey states: "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not sug-
gested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand." Id. at 2826.
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because the states must permit most abortions. Legal purists
can condemn the decision for being "unprincipled," arguing that
either the woman has the right or the state has the power. But
just as Justice Powell forged a doctrine that satisfied, at least
fbr a while, much of the country in Bakke, so Justice Souter
may have created a solution that will defuse the abortion con-
troversy. If so, his opinion will have been, at least for some of
us, a triumph.
HeinOnline  -- 1993 BYU L. Rev. 1138 1993
